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ABSTRACT  
 
Given the advances in technology the field of social network analysis has very much hit 
the forefront in recent years. The information age harnesses the use of social network 
analysis for multiple industries and for solving complex problems. Social network analysis 
is an important tool in the world of the military and counter intelligence, whether it’s the 
capture of Osama Bin Laden or uncovering hidden Al Qaeda  terrorist networks, the world 
around us is built on networks, be that hidden or otherwise.  
Online social networks give new information in the world of intelligence agencies 
similarly online financial communities such as Yahoo Finance gives intelligent 
information to knowledge hungry investors. This thesis is concerned with the exploration 
and exploitation of online financial community dynamics and networks using social 
network analysis (SNA) as a mechanism. Social network analysis measurement techniques 
will be applied to understand the reaction of online investors to military and terrorist  
geopolitical events, the  stock market’s reaction to these events and if it is possible to 
predict military stock prices after military and terrorist geopolitical events.   
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CHAPTER 1  
1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis is concerned with establishing military and terrorist geopolitical events that 
have a measureable influence on military stocks and what influence online financial 
communities have in conjunction to military stock  price movements utilising  current 
online financial market community communication. The model will seek to gauge the  
reaction of online investors to military and terrorist  geopolitical events, the  stock 
market’s reaction to these events and  based on the gathered intelligence, a prediction 
model will be utilised to try and determine future military stock movements for 
geopolitical events measured against the S&P 500. The ultimate aim is to establish a 
framework that aims to understand how military and terrorist geopolitical events are 
reflected in financial markets using Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a knowledge 
management tool. 
This document is broken into a number of sections. The thesis to this dissertation and the 
number of experiments conducted. Chapter 2 will give a brief history of some important 
military and terrorist geopolitical events and feature military and terrorist geopolitics 
within the financial arena by providing a background of what these events consist of and 
how they are defined within the thesis. Some of the key questions posed by social network 
analyses and its value will be addressed in this section. Chapter 3 will consist of the 
literature review and will look at the concepts associated with social network analysis and 
the evolution of same thus including a number of disciplines’ and techniques, which 
incorporate the following: Betweeness, Centrality, Clustering Coefficient, Degree, 
Density, Diameter and Modularity.  The element of data mining to this thesis is not the 
fundamental core objective of the experiments it is a mechanism used herein for data 
extraction and discovery. Data extracts consisting of online communication will be taken 
from Yahoo Finance forums for each of the relevant stocks. Section 4 will outline the 
statistical and data mining methods. Section 5 deals with the experiment approach and 
implementations for each experiment and the analysis of the results. Section 6 will 
summarise and conclude the thesis. 
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The scientific belief of this thesis is that the applied social network analyses and 
prediction model may help investors understand how  military and terrorist geopolitical 
events can affect their investments i.e. portfolio stock prices and how online financial 
communities react and  relate to geopolitical events in addition to understanding  the effect 
of these events on  future military  stock price movement. Moreover by providing this 
research strategists may know what to expect in terms of precedent set forth by previous 
geopolitical military and terrorist events. 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How do online financial communities react to military and terrorist geopolitical events? 
2. How does the stock market react to military and terrorist geopolitical events? 
3. Can military stocks prices be predicted after a military or terrorist geopolitical event? 
1.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experimental design follows a procedure that can be described in the following steps:  
1. Establish a research base for social network analysis and online financial communities. 
2. Define the information and data points needed to support each variable for each of the 
experiments. 
3. Utilise a parser to mine the Yahoo Finance online financial community communication. 
4. Establish, define and classify quantitative SNA metrics exclusive to the experiments. 
5. Compare and contrast the SNA metrics against online communities before and after 
geopolitical events. 
6. Compare and contrast the prices of military stocks before and after geopolitical events. 
7. Compare and contrast military stock price movements against the S&P 500 index 
before and after geopolitical events.   
8. Perform a concluding analysis to the outcome of each experiment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICS ON THE RISE…  
Chapter two looks at the rise of military and terrorist geopolitics in the modern day world 
and what effect geopolitics has on nations. It also looks at military spending and defines 
geopolitical categories that are in scope for this thesis. The chapter also focuses on some 
of the past and most recent military and terrorist geopolitical events and what effect they 
had on the market. Fundamental social network analysis questions key to this thesis are 
also addressed. 
Geopolitical events are somewhat quite difficult to predict and often investment decisions 
rarely incorporate geopolitical risk. Geopolitical risks are always a potential pitfall for any 
investment decision process, with geopolitical risk on the rise, one can conceive the world 
is an unsafe place as is the world of investment decision making. With the end of the Cold 
war, technology brought about a sense of globalisation, privatisation and an increase in 
state owned industries and state intergovernmental generated propaganda. For a while 
global economies focused on their internal infrastructures whilst the wage of war 
subsided, a paradigm shift in the decrease of defence spending begun to have longitudinal 
consequences. The world appeared to be more peaceful. The subprime machine was in full 
swing moving from country to country, continent to continent which encouraged a 
glorious sense of prosperity and economic indulgence. 
Since the crumble of the tsunami of cheap credit and in some cases sovereign debt 
economic and financial market activity has become increasing more volatile. Events 
should as the Arab spring, 9/11 terrorist attacks and the rise of nuclear weapon capabilities 
have had a profound effect on global markets and localised manufacturing output. 
Evidence has demonstrated that geopolitical events shape economies, generate wealth, 
even if that is just short term gains. Geopolitics can potentially shape investment decision 
making thus enhancing countries prosperity. These events can give rise to shrew real time 
investment decisions thus determining how markets behave. In the current political 
environment tensions are high between countries as a result of natural resource scarcity, 
oil, gas, nuclear energy capabilities, have the ability to create wide scale controversy and 
militant events. 
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Nations have resorted to more draconian measures to kick-start their economies. The 
threat of war is a method that generates volatility within the financial markets.  Nathan 
Rothschild, one of the founders of the Rothschild banking dynasty, is probably the single 
investor most associated with profiting from conflict and the related geopolitics. The 
network of agents and investments he built across Europe in the early 1800s enabled him 
to learn of Wellington's victory at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 ahead of other investors. 
He sold heavily, driving the market down and encouraging others to sell, too, only to 
quietly buy again before the victory became known and markets rose. He is said to have 
coined the maxim: "Buy on the sound of cannons, sell on the sound of trumpets." Dyson 
(2013)  
The proliferation of low and high intensity warfare features prominently in this thesis, 
such that the chosen geopolitical warfare events can be split up into two categories: A 
third category exists as deemed below although all of the data has been sourced, it is not in 
scope for this project because of time limitations. Table 1 illustrates same below.  
However, it can be used for a future experiment. 
1 Natural Resource and Energy Geopolitics: Access to oil, gas and countries that 
want to extract and mine foreign state energy reserves. Examples include the 
Libyan Revolution and the current Ukrainian Crises. 
2 Income and Ideological Geopolitics:  Refers to terrorist activity and political 
attacks from terrorist groups and rebel insurgency outfits against domestic 
governments.  The Syrian conflict would embody this ideology. 
3 National Strategic Geopolitics: Consists of nuclear activity ambitions, such as 
plutonium and Uranium manufacturing for the use in nuclear weapons. The Iran 
Nuclear crises and the North Korean nuclear crises personifies same. 
 
Table 1   Geopolitical categorisation 
Military expenditure has been on the rise since the end of the cold war. World military 
expenditure in 2012 is estimated to have reached $1.756 trillion. The USA with its 
massive spending budget has long been the principal determinant of the current world 
trend, often accounting for close to half of the entire world’s military expenditure. The 
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effects of global financial crisis and the post Iraq and Afghanistan military operations have 
seen a decline in its spending; now accounting for 39% of spending in 2012. (Global 
Issues). Figure 1 illustrates the World Military expenditure. To this end, the stock 
selection focuses on American military stocks. Interesting in today’s world strategic 
power between heavy weight nations are less defined, the great  superpower giants of 
yesteryear  are now focusing their battle for supremacy by aligning their military 
sovereignty, technology and science with the emerging nations and rebel insurgency 
groups to not only increase their personal GDP, but also to quash the rise of religious 
beliefs.  
 
 
Figure 1   World Military spending 2003 - 2012 
2.1 MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICS AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Sam Stovall, chief equity strategist at S&P Capital IQ, conducted a broad study last 
year of how U.S. stocks reacted since World War II to anything ranging from wars, near 
wars, assassinations, assassination attempts, terrorist attacks and financial collapses. In the 
14 examples he cited, he found a running theme: Stocks initially sold off, but then didn’t 
take long to rebound and recover those losses. The chart below, courtesy of S&P Capital 
IQ, expands upon those examples (WSJ)  
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Figure 2   Shocks to the system: Market declines and recovery since WWII 
Focusing on terrorist and warfare events, it took the S&P 500 18 and 19 days to recover 
from the 9/11 and Madrid attacks respectively. The Pearl Harbour attack took the biggest 
single warfare S&P 500 recovery with 257 days. What is striking is the bottomed out % 
change in the 9/11 attack and the Pearl Harbour attack. Percentage wise its quite similar 
11.6% and 10.8% even though the days to recovery gap appear to have no correlation. It 
could potentially appear that modern day investors have adapted to military geopolitical 
events as a result of their alarming frequency and predetermined precedents. However 
when the world appeared to be on the brink of disaster during the Cuban missile crises’, 
the market only took a mere 5 days to recover from the bottomed out position. Crises not 
related to terror and warfare attacks such as the Lehman bankruptcy have had even more 
ephemeral resonance for the market, nevertheless this evidence illustrates that terrorism 
and warfare have initial negative effects on the markets. 
Company stock prices and the stock markets in general can be influenced by world events 
such as war, civil unrest and terrorism. These influences can be direct and indirect and 
they often occur in chain reactions. For example, the social uncertainty and fear generated 
by the terrorist attacks on September 11
th
 2001 affected markets directly as they caused 
many investors in the United States to trade less and to focus on stocks and bonds with 
less risk. From my own personal experience whilst working on the Convertible trading 
desk for an American derivate firm on that ill-fated day, the direction was to sell all stocks 
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correlated to the attack (e.g. airlines stocks) and shift the capital to debt instruments such 
as US Government bonds and Treasury Bills.  Indirectly, you can expect the stocks of 
military equipment companies and weapons manufacturers to rise in value as a nation 
gears up for armed conflict due to increased demand. 
War affects the value of assets above all else. Even the suggestion of a war in the Middle 
East is often enough for the price of crude oil to sky-rocket due to the region being such a 
major oil exporter. Oil stocks have a negative correlation so rising oil prices due to 
political unrest usually signals falling stock prices, especially those stocks denominated in 
dollars and energy stocks. 
It is perhaps not surprising that some economists point to a potential economic upside to 
war. War at times can kick-start a struggling economy especially its manufacturing base 
when forced to concentrate its efforts on war time production. Think of the United States 
in World War II. The U.S.’s entry into the war following the attacks on Pearl Harbour 
almost instantly pulled the country out of the grips of the Great Depression Banc De 
Binary (2014) 
Dyson (2013) looked at analysis conducted by Deutsche Bank, which was circulated to its 
institutional clients, which studied 12 conflicts over the past 30 years. The first was the 
missile strike ordered by President Reagan on Libya in April 1986. This was a response to 
the bombing, 10 days earlier, of a Berlin nightclub in which American soldiers were 
killed. The most recent of the 12 conflicts analysed by Deutsche was the March 2011 
deployment of aircraft over Libya i.e. Operation Ellamy, when a coalition of Western 
states including Britain intervened in the Libyan civil war. Between these two conflicts 
Deutsche Bank looked at 10 other events involving US and Western forces, including the 
1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Iraqi Kurdish conflict, the Afghanistan war in late 2001 and the 
2003 Iraq war. With each event, analysts sought to identify a precise date on which the US 
entered the conflict, and then study the market either side of this date by examining the 
commonly followed S&P 500 index of leading US companies. Three data points were 
collected for each event: the highest point in the three months preceding the strike date, 
the strike date itself and the market's position one month after the strike date. In all 12 
cases the market on the strike date was below the high point of the three previous months, 
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although the fall varied. The smallest drop was 1pc (Bosnia, August 1995) and the largest 
15pc (Afghanistan, 2001).  
The data relating to the weeks after the strike was more dramatic. Although many of those 
conflicts would drag on for months or years, the S&P 500 tended to rise sharply after 
intervention. In every single case the index rose during the month following the strike, by 
as much as 18pc (the 1991 Gulf War). In seven cases out of 12 the S&P 500 reached a 
higher point one month after the strike date than the highest point in the three months 
before it. Overall, across the 12 conflicts the S&P  500 fell by an average of 5.9pc from a 
high point in the three months preceding the strike to the strike day itself. In the following 
month the average rally was 7pc.  Revisiting Nathan Rothschild famous words from 1815 
“Buy on the sound of canons” suggests that this investment strategy would appear still be 
widely practiced. 
Bremmer and Keat (2009) state “a growing number of investors and policymakers 
understand the importance of political risk. Yet they also know that they lack a 
comprehensive and systemic set of tools for evaluating these risks” With the application of 
SNA to online financial communities in times of geopolitical events some key questions 
arise. Can historical SNA online financial community mined data and historical 
geopolitical military and terrorist events be used to form future prediction geopolitical 
military models for Investment banks? Can future geopolitical military prediction models 
be classed as a business asset for the Investment banking Industry? Is there value in 
providing an automated algorithmic application that will mine historical SNA, geopolitical 
military and terrorists events to buy and sell military associated stocks once intelligent 
systems realise pending geopolitical events are unfolding,  for example the application of 
Nathan Rothschild’s rule in alliance with the parameters set forth from  the Deutsche Bank 
report. Furthermore could this become a commercially viable product?   
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CHAPTER 3 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 3 contains the literature review. The literature review of this thesis will seek to 
provide a basis for the experimental approach by doing so the literature review will start 
by introducing the world of SNA inclusive of social capital, small world and SNA theory 
and provide a review of existing methodologies and papers in the field. Thereafter existing 
approaches to handing and exploring social network analysis techniques will be discussed. 
3.1 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Given the advances in technology the field of social network analysis has very much hit 
the forefront in recent years. The information age harnesses the use of social network 
analysis for multiple industries and for solving complex problems. Whilst my project is 
concerned with the use of SNA for online financial communities discussing stocks, there 
are many areas that the SNA science can be applied to. Wasserman and Faust state “Social 
network analysis is inherently an indisplincinary endeavour” SNA has its roots associated 
with many disciplines these include social sciences, applied mathematics, statistical and 
computing methodology 
Social media services, such as Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, among others, create a 
wealth of data that has the potential to provide new insights to marketers, social scientists, 
community administrators, and system developers. Much of this data comes in the form of 
networks: people connected via friend and follow relationships, websites connected via 
hyperlinks, and books connected to other books based on shared purchasing patterns. Over 
the past decades, researchers have developed sophisticated techniques for analysing and 
visualising network data, particularly social network data Hansen et al (2009). 
Communication patterns were modelled in the “Analysis of Facebook Social Network” the 
intention was to offer a unique perspective of how society functions and to uncover hidden 
relationships in the Facebook network Akhtar et al (2013). 
As pointed out in the Gartner study, this huge development in social networks leads to the 
growing need for social network mining and SNA methods in order to provide deeper 
comprehension of the networks and to detect communities. SNA has found applications in 
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various areas like computer science, life sciences, law enforcement agencies, civil society 
organisations, network operators Gartner (2008). 
Typically the SNA will look to analyse all connections between the nodes (or vertices). In 
Wen-Chih Chang “Applied Social Network Analysis to Project Curriculum (2010)” paper 
he used a model based on six degrees of separation theory. The aim and objective in the 
social network analysis was to represent the strength of relationships between team 
members but also to illustrate the individual role in his (/her) own network. Thus, the team 
member can observe what the role they play in the team and how to strengthen 
communicative skills with their partners. From an organisational perspective this can be 
used as a knowledge management tool to understand the strengths and weakness of each 
of the nodes on the network. 
Work such as “Do you know the way to SNA” undertook an experiment to understand how 
graduates could apply SNA to data from online communities. What becomes clear is the 
fact that SNA tools are very much in their infancy in terms of ease of use, unlike tools 
such as Google Analytics. Hansen et al (2009) demonstrates through their experiments 
that SNA tools graduates can effectively grasp the working of SNA within a short space of 
time; however the experiment does make reference to the fact that the SNA practise would 
benefit more if there was a toolset that reduced processing complexity. It could be 
perceived that the SNA toolset or metrics outlined in this thesis could have potential merit 
in terms of a standard SNA framework.  
Kristin Forbes Robert Rigobon (2002)  “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring 
Stock Market Co-movements,"  paper aimed to  understand contagion coefficients in times 
of market crisis during the events of the Mexican peso collapse, the 87 US stock Market 
Crash and the Asian crisis. The measurement of same appeared to be quite manual and 
labour intensive. It could be argued that use of a SNA tools for this particular experiment 
may have uncovered a greater degree of correlation or indeed a greater discovery of high 
market co movement. 
Antweiler W, Frank MZ (2004) researched the idea that the markets are influenced by 
negative and positive news in times of crisis and this has a strong correlation to 
geopolitical events. More than 1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and 
Raging Bull about 45 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones 
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Internet Index, by measuring bullishness. They found that stock messages helped to 
predict market volatility both on a daily base and also within the same trading day. More 
specifically, they found that higher message postings predicted negative subsequent 
returns  
More recently Bollen J, Mao H, Zeng X (2011) found that Twitter mood predicted more 
than 80% of daily volatility of closing values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The 
use of SNA in both of these experiments highlights the value of the SNA toolset in terms 
of financial and monetary gain. Gloor et al (2009) demonstrated that useful trends can be 
identified using SNA by calculating the betweenness’s centrality for online communities.  
Khonsari, K.K. et al (2010) found that political groups also find use for SNA. In the social 
network analysis of” Iran’s Green Movement Opposition Groups using Twitter”  paper the 
SNA aimed to identify the structure of the Green party using the twitter application to 
voice their disapproval and opposition that they perceived to be a fraudulent election. 
In the world of counterterrorism, social network analysis can effectively become the social 
“terror” network analysis.  Governments and intelligence agencies now use SNA as a tool 
to prevent terrorism. The SNA methods deployed are no different from the methods 
applied elsewhere in this literature review. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, many 
researchers have started to apply social network analysis in the fields of counter-terrorism, 
which has become a new and popular tool for counter-terrorism research. Such 
information as social relationships among terrorists, correlations of terrorists during 
planning, organising and conducting terrorist activities as well as time and locations of 
terrorist activities provides a basis for analysing terrorist networks Julei Fu et al (2012) 
Similarity Krebs (2002) “Mapping Networks of Terrorist cells” used publically available 
data to map the 9/11 terrorist network. To capture the data for the SNA Krebs collected 
data pertaining to the hijacker’s links and relationships from data pertaining to major 
newspaper articles for a few weeks after the attack. 
3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY 
One of the most fundamental aspects of social capital theory is that SNA represents value; 
all social ties in various networks can be conceived as channels for the flow of data, 
information and knowledge. The structure represents the value of the network. A number 
of SNA metrics which represent the value will be discussed herein.   Colman (1998) 
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outlines that “Two main characteristics are common for all forms of social capital: (i) 
they comprise a part of the social structure and (ii) they facilitate the actions of 
individuals in that structure” Theoretically social capital is normally associated with 
capital in monetary terms, however in a metaphorical sense social capital in SNA refers to 
value and strength of the ties and entities of the network.  Moreover Mark Granovetter 
work on in his widely cited 1973 article “The Strength of Weak Ties,” argues that “weak 
ties” are more important than “strong ties” and that  includes  your relationships with 
family and close friends  when trying to find employment.  Granovetter’s article and 
subsequent research extended this argument by positing that more disperse, non-
redundant, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, 
denser, and more interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of 
knowledge and information. 
Chung et al (2013) relays a classic example of trading in the diamond market in New York 
where bags of diamonds often worth thousands of dollars were exchanged amongst 
merchants frequently to other merchants for them to inspect at their own leisure. 
Considering that this was done without any formal insurance, an objective observer might 
think it to be risky as there could be potential for opportunities of fraud and theft. 
However, the market was extremely successful and efficient. Coleman argued that the 
market worked because of closeness, high degree of trust and trustworthiness amongst the 
merchants; thus attributing the success of the markets to high levels of social capital. 
Considering we will be reviewing terrorist networks in terms of SNA metrics Perliger, et 
al (2011) definition of social capital becomes appealing   “One of the main advantages 
which SNA provides for students of terrorists groups is the capability to uncover the 
informal division of influence and social capital within the group, which, in turn, 
influences the group’s internal political and social processes and the outcome of its 
activities”  
Likewise within online financial communities social capital exists as does weak and 
strong ties and as per Colman’s theory social structures will emerge from the shadows. 
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3.3 IT’S A SMALL WORLD 
A distinguished gentleman is sitting in a side walk café in Venice, needing a light for a 
cigarette. He asks the man next to his table for a light. They fall into conversation; the man 
at the table is an American who spent time in Ireland during the Celtic tiger years in the 
financial district. “This may appear to be a silly question” says the distinguished 
gentleman “however did you ever hear of a person called Martin O Farrell Usher?” 
“Martin O Farrell Usher from Oldcastle, tall, handsome chap” said the American. “Yes” 
said the gentleman. “I don’t believe it!” said the American; “I know him well and his 
family!” “That’s incredulous” replied the gentleman, “Good Lord it’s a small world” 
Almost all of us have had this experience, where we have encountered a stranger far from 
home and much to our surprise they share a mutual acquaintance. This type of experience 
occurs with sufficient frequency such that almost everyone says “It’s a small world”  
One of the best known and earliest SNA experiments was conducted by professor Stanley 
Milgram in 1967.The experiment consisted of mailing 160 letters to randomly chosen 
individuals in Nebraska. Once each recipient received the letter the objective was then to 
get the letter to a Stockbroker in Boston using intermediaries known to one another on a 
first name basis. In all 42 letters reached the target destination.   This experiment became 
known as the “Small world effect”. Milgram’s experiment was designed to explore the 
properties of social networks: interconnecting bonds of friendship among individuals in a 
society. Amongst the letters that arrived at the desired location, it was derived that the 
average path length was 6; this led to the phrase, “the six degrees of separation”. What 
was of significance was the empirically gained insight into the configuration aspects, of 
social networks which laid the foundation for most of the concluding work. Milgram 
(1967) points to the following:  
 (i) In those chains, participants were three times more, likely to contact people of the 
same gender.  
(ii) Many chains passed through the same few people – stars – as the last step before 
reaching the target person. (iii) Although physical distance is important in the chains of 
intermediaries, social distance seems even more important.  
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The Small World Effect describes that network size does not have any effect on length of 
ties among nodes. In other words, the distance between any pair of nodes is much smaller 
than the size of the network 
3.4 SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
One way we can think about social networks is to use the mathematical discipline of graph 
theory. Graphs are defined as a collection of points called vertices that are connected in 
pairs by lines called Edges Oram (2001). When sociologists borrowed this way of 
graphing things from the mathematicians, they renamed their graphs as "sociograms". 
There are a number of variations on the theme of sociograms, but they all share the 
common feature of using a labelled circle for each actor in the population we are 
describing, and line segments between pairs of actors to represent the observation that a tie 
exists between the two. Visualisation by displaying a sociogram as well as a summary of 
graph theoretical concepts provides a first description of social network data Mohsen 
Jamali and Hassan Abolhassani (2012). 
“…the workers have – whether aware of it or not – formed themselves into a group with 
appropriate customs, duties, routines, even rituals” (Mayo, 1971) 
Elton Mayo most famous for the Hawthorn experiments stated that the industrial world at 
the beginning of the twentieth century was more technologically advanced than ever 
before while being more socially incompetent than ever Bendix & Fisher (1949). In his 
studies of factory work and interactions between workers, Mayo pioneered the use of 
sociograms to depict interpersonal relations and group structure and was thus among the 
first to systematically depict the importance of spontaneous cooperation being organised 
by workers. Moreover, Mayo noticed that managers who had some level of understanding 
of the social processes such as group solidarity among workers had a greater ability to 
control and influence worker behavior Scott, J., (2000). Finally, Mayo explicitly linked 
socio-emotional issues with productivity through cooperation and job satisfaction Mayo 
(1971). This created the point of departure for not only the Human Relations school but 
also of the study of the informal structures and the focus on relations as the unit of 
analysis Mayo, (1939), which is the most central issue of SNA. 
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Berkowitz (1982) states that social network analysis is a set of research procedures for 
identifying structures in systems based on the relations among actors. Grounded in graph 
and system theories, this approach has proven to be a powerful tool for studying networks 
in physical and social worlds, including on the web. Faust (1997) declares that SNA 
focuses on relations and ties in studying actor’s behavior and attitudes. Thus the positions 
of actors within a network and the strength of ties between them become critically 
important. Social positions can be evaluated by finding the centrality of a node identified 
through a number of connections among network members. Such measures are used to 
characterise degrees of influence, prominence and importance of certain members. 
Networks are interchangeable and consonantly evolving, network activity may change 
from day to day as each node activity may increase or decrease over the lifespan of the 
network. Social network analysis is a distinct research perspective within the social and 
behavioral sciences, as the social network perspective is based on the assumption of the 
importance on relational concepts or processes between individuals. Wasserman and Faust 
(1994) noted four characterising principles of social network analysis. 
 (1) Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, 
autonomous units. 
 (2) Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or 'flow' of 
resources (either material or nonmaterial) 
 (3) Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as 
providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action. 
 (4) Network models conceptualise structure (social, economic, political, and so forth) as 
lasting patterns of relations among actors. 
Jacob Levi Moreno, was heavily involved in advancing the notion of sociometry (i.e. the 
measurement of social relationships)  this involved the plotting of social relations, this had 
been a project that had been progressing since the First World War According to Moreno. 
The brutality and meaninglessness of the war prompted social scientists to reconsider their 
views of society and the place of the individual within it and in an effort to understand the 
emancipation and dispersement of a common structured civil society. Moreno created 
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actors as nodes and denoted the ties with lines. Moreno presents the following definition: 
“Sociometric procedures try to lay bare the fundamental structures within a society by 
disclosing the affinities, attractions and repulsions, operation between persons and 
persons and between persons and objects” Moreno (1937). 
3.5 SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS AND METRICS 
Theoretically social network activity depends on the movement of its actors. An actor or 
otherwise known as a node on the network can refer to a person or entity that has an 
interaction with another person or entity. The most important property of an actor is the 
measure of centrality in the network. Any relationships between actors are referred to as a 
tie, which typically links the pair together. A pair of actors with interconnecting ties 
between them is known as a “Dyad”.  Similarly where three actors exist with 
interconnecting ties, this is known as a “Triad”. A “Subgroup “can consist of dyads and 
Triads in any social network. Wasserman and Faust (1994) refer to a group as “a 
collection of all actors on which ties are too be measured” further to the definition they 
state that “once one decides to gather data on a group, a more concrete meaning of the 
term is necessary. A group then consists of a finite set or sets of actors who for 
conceptual, theoretical or empirical reasons are treated as a finite set of individuals on 
which network measurements are made”. The strength of the tie is denoted by the 
frequency and duration of contact of use over a period of time.  In the case of this thesis 
the groups will consists of all of the actors associated with a single stock from the online 
financial communities.  
There are two types of variables that can be included in a network data set: structural and 
composition. Structural variables are measured on pairs of actors and are the cornerstone 
of social network datasets.  Structural variables measure ties of a specific kind between 
pairs of actors. For example structural variables can measure business transactions 
between corporations, friendships between people or trade between nations. Actors 
comprising these pairs usually belong to a single set of actors.  
Composition variables are measurements of actors attributes, Composition variables, or 
actor attribute variables, are of the standard social and behavioral science variety and are 
defined at the level of individual actors. For example we might record gender, race or 
17 
 
ethnicity for people, or geographical location, after tax profits or numbers of employees 
for corporations  Wasserman and Faust (1994). The social networks that form part of the 
experiments contained herein will be largely based on structured variables, that form a 
“two mode network” which can be described as a network that focuses largely on one set 
of actors (i.e. the Yahoo Finance online financial community for a particular stocks) and 
one set of events (the actual listed geopolitical war or terrorist listed in chapter 5) 
3.5.1 GRAPH THEORY 
Graph theory is essential and at the core of SNA. Graph theory is used in the identification 
of the most influential actors in the network. Metrics that can be derived from the graph 
theory are outlined herein. The prominence of actors can be measured in terms of 
centrality within the network. When a graph is used as a model of a social network, points 
(called nodes) are used to represent actors, and lines connecting the points are used to 
represent the ties between the actors. In this sense a graph is a model of a social network 
in the same way that a model train set is a model of a railway system Wasserman and 
Faust (1994). Nodes or actors can also be referred to as vertices or points, lines are 
commonly known as edges and sometimes arcs. Social network graphs consists of two 
sets of information, a number or set of nodes N = {n1, n2 n3} and a set of lines L = {l1, 
l2, l3} between pairs of nodes where N = Nodes and L = Lines. Ties are either present or 
nonexistent between actors, thus indicating an undirected dichotomous relation. Non 
directional relations include informal groupings. Wasserman and Faust (1994) state “In a 
graph of a social network with a single non-directional dichotomous, relation, the node 
represent actors, and the lines represent the ties that exist between pairs of actors on the 
relation” Graphs are essential to display the network variables for visualisation purposes. 
To display the output of the experiments in graph format the open source product Gephi 
will be used.  SNA methods and Metrics (2011) refer in the most common sense of the 
term, a graph is an ordered pair G = (V, E) comprising a set V of vertices or nodes 
together with a set E of edges or lines, which are 2-element subsets of V (i.e., an edge is 
related with two vertices, and the relation is represented as unordered pair of the vertices 
with respect to the particular edge). To avoid ambiguity, this type of graph may be 
described precisely as undirected and simple. In graph theory, a vertex (plural vertices) or 
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node is the fundamental unit out of which graphs are formed: an undirected graph consists 
of a set of vertices and a set of edges (unordered pairs of vertices), while a directed graph 
consists of a set of vertices and a set of arcs (ordered pairs of vertices). From the point of 
view of graph theory, vertices are treated as featureless and indivisible objects, although 
they may have additional structure depending on the application from which the graph 
arises; for instance, a semantic network is a graph in which the vertices represent concepts 
or classes of objects. The two vertices forming an edge are said to be its endpoints, and the 
edge is said to be incident to the vertices. A vertex w is said to be adjacent to another 
vertex v if the graph contains an edge (v, w). The neighborhood of a vertex v is an induced 
subgraph of the graph, formed by all vertices adjacent to v. The degree of a vertex in a 
graph is the number of edges incident to it. An isolated vertex is a vertex with degree zero; 
that is, a vertex that is not an endpoint of any edge. A leaf vertex (also pendant vertex) is a 
vertex with degree one. In a directed graph, one can distinguish the out-degree (number of 
outgoing edges) from the in-degree (number of incoming edges); a source vertex is a 
vertex with in-degree zero, while a sink vertex is a vertex with out-degree zero.  
3.5.2  CENTRALISATION 
The Centralisation concept refers to the difference between the number of ties for each 
node divided by maximum possible sum of differences.  A centralised network will have 
many of its links dispersed around one or a few nodes, while a decentralised network is 
one in which there is little variation between the numbers of ties each node possesses. The 
idea of centrality as applied to human communication was introduced by Bavelas in 1948. 
Chung et al (2013) uses the following definition Centralisation explains the extent to 
which the connectedness is focused around a particular node. To measure centralisation 
in a network, we need to observe the differences in the centrality values of the most central 
nodes and all the other nodes. Then, to arrive at the centralisation value, we calculate the 
ratio of the sum of actual differences and the sum of the maximum possible differences. 
Centralisation is thus defined as: 
          
∑  
 
       (  )    
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Where (  ) is the number of people in the network that are directly linked to a person? 
The number of actors is represented by    in this equation.  
Perliger et al (2011) looked at In-betweenness as the division of power within a group. His 
paper focused on the Jewish Terror organisation who were a group of religious zealots 
who were responsible for terrorist attacks against Arabs in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem In defining the actors on the network that have unique characteristics, First is 
the classic hub, or an actor that has a significantly higher number of ties than other 
members (high level of centrality). Such a member is, in many cases, responsible for 
coordinating the group’s activities, for recruitment of members, and has the ability to 
manipulate the flow of information within the group more easily. Figure 3 illustrates what 
Perliger refers to as the classic hub, in other words the hive of activity. To illustrate, in the 
case of the Israeli Jewish Underground terrorist group the hubs intentionally did not reveal 
the long-term highly extreme goals of the group to some members in order not to alienate 
them from participating in short-term less extreme operations. The hubs were able to do 
that not just because of their high level of centrality, but since entire sections of the 
network were dependent on them for connection with other parts of the network (high 
level of betweenness). Since a relatively high number of members were tied to the 
network via a specific hub, this also implies that the hubs were responsible for recruitment 
processes. Finally, the importance of detecting the hubs stems not just from the fact that 
this allows us to uncover the power division within the network and who possesses more 
social capital (Bourdieu 1986) but also to better understand the motives beyond the 
group’s actions. As demonstrated by Pedahzur and Perliger, (2006), by looking at the 
characteristics and history of the hubs, the researchers were able to detect the motivations 
behind the attacks of the studied networks of Palestinian suicide bombers, epitomising that 
the “hubs” will, in many cases, use the networks to promote personal or local political 
interests. 
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Figure 3 The Jewish Underground Terrorist group 
The case of the Jewish Underground also exemplifies that a high number of ties is not the 
only criteria for detecting informal leaders. While some groups pose a dense structure, 
others are constructed as bundle of connected subgroups. In this case, the actors who are 
in strategic locations and serve as connectors between the different subgroups possess 
significant power and are crucial for the survival of the network. While they do not have 
to be connected to high numbers of members, they can veto almost any operation that 
needs the cooperation of the different subgroups. Finally, there are those who do not have 
a particularly large number of ties, nor are they connectors between different parts of the 
network, but they are situated in a strategic location in terms of their proximity to hubs or 
to large numbers of members within the network; hence, they have high level of access to 
information and resources. Chug et al (2013) refer to online social networks and the way 
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in which people socially engage with each other. They go further by stating “ In network 
parlance, this pattern is suggestive of assortativity - the tendency in networks where 
individual actors connect with other actors who are similar to themselves based on 
certain characteristics . Thus, in the example of OSNs and its users, assortativity can be 
defined in terms of attributes such as willingness, frequency of usage or use per se of the 
OSNs for community building. From a networks perspective, one could also assess 
network assortativity, or the homophily of the OSN based on the number of messages one 
sends and/or receives. For instance, in the Twitter social network, it has been shown that 
happy users tend to connect to happy users whereas unhappy users tend to be 
predominantly connected to unhappy users measured by the Subject Well-being index. 
This was attributed to two mechanisms: (i) homophily -where “birds of a feather flock 
together” and (ii) mood contagion - where unhappy actors converged to other unhappy 
actors thus making them unhappier”  
Therefore it’s arguable that assortabiity and centralisation have a correlation. 
 (i) Homophily - i.e. terrorist groups, online financial communities: Each has a common 
goal, to receive, retrieve, capture and execute information and knowledge 
 ii) Mood shared interest: Depending on the severity of the geopolitical event, this could 
potentially affect an online community’s behavior. 
3.5.3 DEGREE CENTRALITY 
To understand the importance of nodes on a graph, Degree centrality is used. The 
centrality measurement is concerned with finding influential people on the network; 
however it is also concerned with the number of degrees of the user. The centrality of a 
node depends on the number of nodes attached to it directly. It can be best described as 
where most of the activity is occurring on the network and is commonly used to 
understand the potency or might of the information authority on the network. Kretschmer 
(2010) outlines: The original used measures of social network analysis (SNA) are related 
to Wassermann & Faust 
 The Degree Centrality (DCA) of a node A is equal to the number of nodes (or ties) to 
which this node is connected. For example, in collaboration networks in armies the degree 
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centrality of a node A is equal to the number of node collaborators or senior army 
personnel. An actor (node) with a high degree centrality is active in collaboration. That 
node has collaborated with many armies. In correspondence with Wassermann and Faust 
the Group Degree Centralisation quantifies the variability or dispersion of the individual 
Degree Centralities of the nodes. Centralisation describes the extent to which the links 
(ties) are organised around particular focal nodes, i.e. it provides a measure on the extent 
to which a whole network has a centralised structure. There are several degree based 
measures of graph centralisation. One of them is as follows: 
 GDC = ∑
(       )
(   )(   )
 
             
(   )(   ) reaches its maximum value of 1 when one actor (node) has collaborated 
with all other v-1 actor, and the other actors interact only with this one, central actor. This 
is exactly the case in a star graph. The index attains its minimum value of 0 when all 
degrees are equal. Therefore, representing the weight graph is very necessary in finding 
the influential people. In summary the unweighted measure means the ties (or nodes) are 
counted independently from the strength of the ties. If the network is directed (meaning 
that ties have direction), then we usually define two separate measures of degree 
centrality, namely in-degree and out degree. In-degree is a count of the number of ties 
directed to the node, and out-degree is the number of ties that the node directs to others. 
Kretschmer method could be potentially suitable for the case of online communities, as it 
focuses on the number of interactions between nodes inclusive of reply interactions. 
Referring to Roy, R.B.; Sarkar, U.K (2011), the Degree centrality method was used to 
identify influential stocks in the global market using various centrality measures and 
examine change in their ranks following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the USA. The 
findings from the social network concluded that there was dominance in terms of 
geographical positioning. European stocks were seen to be more influential than global 
stocks in terms of stock market behavior based on a degree centrality. Rachman et al 
(2013) used degree centrality method to discover the highest frequency of tweets; retweets 
and replies in the twitter application to locate the most important influential person on the 
network.  Koochakzadeh et al (2012) created a social network of financial expert’s in an 
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effort to allow novice investors model their investment behavior on similar likeminded 
financial experts. Behavior similarities are taken into account and the social network is 
then used to recommend an appropriate managed portfolio to non-professional investors 
based on their behavioral similarities to the expert investors. The degree centralities of 
each expert investor were measured, the highest centralities represented the low risk 
investors and investors that shared the same appetite for risk were aligned accordingly to 
that portfolio investment strategy. Zheng Chen and Xiaoqing Du (2013) use degree 
metrics to understand the interactions from the Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange, and 
the online Chinese stock forum Guba.com.cn. The paper is concerned with understanding 
online behavior in relation to stock movements. Their experiment uses two degree 
methods: the average degree which represents the strength of the users and the standard 
degree which shows how much variation or dispersion exist from the average node. 
3.5.4 DENSITY  
Network density represents the actual number of ties in a network as a ratio of the total 
maximum ties that are possible with all the nodes of the network. A fully dense network 
has a network density value of 1, which indicates that all nodes are connected to each 
other. A network with a density value near 0 indicates that it is a sparsely knit network. 
Hence, density is a measure of network cohesiveness. For a directed graph with  nodes, 
density   is defined as 
    
∑           
 (   )
 
Krebs (2002) “Mapping Networks of Terrorist cells” used publically available data to map 
the 9/11 terrorist network. To capture the data for the SNA Krebs collected data pertaining 
to the hijacker’s links and relationships from major newspaper for a few weeks after the 
attack. The SNA illustrated how sparse the network was and how distant i.e. “low density” 
many of the hijackers on the same team were from each other. Many pairs of team 
members were beyond the horizon of observability from each other.  A strategy for 
keeping cell members distant from each other, and from other cells, minimises damage to 
the network if a cell member is captured or otherwise compromised. Osama bin Laden 
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even described this plan in his infamous videotape, which was found in Afghanistan. In 
the transcript (U.S. Department of Defence, 2001) Osama bin Laden mentions: 
"Those who were trained to fly didn't know the others. One group of people did not know 
the other group." Judging from this statement its clear the terrorist group had a clear 
strategy for managing the control of information and knowledge via actors on the network. 
What is interesting here is, did the terrorist group use a SNA model to ensure the 
distribution of knowledge and information was kept to a minimum?     
In the world of espionage and terrorist activity we can now see a mechanism that can be 
used to counter terrorism. In cases where military teams or investigation teams have 
suspicions or indeed receive intelligence regarding certain groups the SNA inclusive of 
the networks to map will form a basis of knowledge to act upon. This will allow for the 
identification of key personnel and target opportunities to prevent the transfer of 
knowledge with the terrorist group. Taking figure 4 into consideration, hypothetically 
speaking if the CIA used the SNA appropriately (as it is widely believed that the CIA had 
ground intelligence on all of the hijackers) it’s quite possible that if this knowledge was 
managed correctly the CIA could have potentially used the “six degrees of separation” 
theory to remove Mohamed Atta from the network. Because he had the highest degree of 
centrality, closeness and in-betweeness, this could have potentially prevented the attack 
from taking place. 
Let’s assume the 9/11 attack did not take place, Figure 4 and figure 6 below could be 
leveraged to provide a graphical illustration of the current communication and knowledge 
transfer between the terrorist group members. Where new members have been identified 
as part of the terrorist network each can be added as a node to the network ultimately 
bringing the geography of the terrorist group to life. By managing this knowledge base 
this in itself becomes a real asset in counter intelligence. The same method could be 
applied to all online communities.  
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Figure 4 Krebs (2002) 9/11 SNA model 
3.5.5 CLUSTERING CO-EFFICIENT 
To understand that how the network is likely to behave, it is necessary to segregate nodes 
into cliques. It can be a very important aspect of social structure. A clique is simply a sub-
graph in which all nodes are more closely tied to each other than they are to nodes who are 
not part of the graph, similarly it can depict the closeness of groups within social 
networks. The clustering coefficient of a node i, denoted by c (i), is defined as the number 
of directed links that exist between the node’s neighbours, divided by the number of 
possible directed links that could exist between the node’s neighbours. Thus, if a node i’s 
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neighbours have n directed links between them, then the clustering coefficient of I is 
defined as 
 ( )  
 
  (    )
 
 
The clustering coefficient of a graph is the average clustering coefficient of all its nodes, 
and can be denoted as follows  C (G) or  
C (G) = Ev∈V  ( )  
               |v | 
 
Thus, the clustering coefficient of a graph ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values 
representing a higher degree of “cliquishness” between the nodes. In particular, a graph 
with clustering coefficient of 0 contains no “triangles” of connected nodes, whereas a 
graph with clustering coefficient of 1 is a perfect clique.  Aggarwal (2011) refers to the 
probability that the two related nodes are associated with each other, or the level to which 
nodes are "friends" to each other. This coefficient illustrates the strength of connection in 
the network neighbourhood of the observed node. It is calculated as the ratio of the 
number of connections between the neighbours of the observed node and potential 
connections unestablished by its neighbours.  Watts and Strogatz (1998) found that high 
clustering and short characteristic chain length are the distinctive properties of many 
small-world networks. They defined a “clustering coefficient” (C) to represent the amount 
of clustering. Wang (2012) states: the clustered is the important features of social systems 
and economic systems. In his securities network stocks or bonds have links connected 
with other nodes    (i.e. other stocks and bonds). If the nearest neighbor of the initial node 
(stock or bond) is part of the entire group then there is links among them to calculate a 
cluster coefficient. Bai et al (2011) puts forward a community identification method based 
on clustering coefficient, which identifies the hidden community structure in the network, 
but also can reasonably process boundary nodes that simultaneously belong to several 
communities.  Interestingly the cluster co efficient would appear to be an ideal technique 
in uncovering hidden dark networks as described by Raab and Milward (2003).  The goal 
of his paper is to identify actors and organisations that operate in a two dimensional 
environment consisting of illegal and legal activities. They further the hypothesis by 
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stating “that there maybe connections between the illegal networks, dark networks in our 
terms and the legal networks striving to destroy them. In a world of illegal activity a CIA 
agent who penetrates a terrorist network is called a double agent.”  Figure 5 below 
illustrates reciprocal relationships between amongst illegal network linked to legal 
organisations trying to control or curtain the illegal activity. According to Raab and 
Milward (2003) it also captures the possibility of interpretation between illegal and legal 
networks. Forgetting the requirement to be functionally non-judgmental in the social 
sciences, the actors and organisations that cooperate in the problem space are called dark 
networks, in that their activities are both covert and illegal. Figure 5 illustrates makes full 
use of the clustering coefficient by providing a visualisation of the cliques with the 
network. 
 
Figure 5   Raab and Milward (2003) Reciprocal relationships between amongst illegal 
network linked to legal organisations 
Krebs (2002) denotes: for a small network of less than 20 nodes, we see a long average 
path length of 4.75 steps. Several of the hijackers are separated by more than 6 steps. 
From this metric and from Bin Laden's comments above we see that covert networks trade 
efficiency for secrecy. This detection method can be used to discover hidden secret 
networks within online financial communities. A hidden network could be a network 
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whose sole objective is to prevent liquidity for particular stocks on the market to aid a 
geopolitical terrorist or warfare events. 
 
Table 2: Small-World Network Metrics 
There is a constant dynamic between keeping the network hidden and actively using it to 
accomplish objectives (Baker and Faulkner, 1993) to this end Krebs (2002) identifies that 
six shortcuts were added to the network temporarily in order to collaborate and coordinate. 
These shortcuts reduced the average path length in the network by over 40% thus 
improving the information flow in the network as illustrated in table 2. When the network 
is brought closer together by these shortcuts, all of the pilots ended up in a small clique the 
perfect structure to efficiently coordinate tasks and activities. Figure 6 illustrates the pilot   
network. The gold bars indicate the clustering co-efficient, the coming together of the pilot 
“clique” in the network.  
 
 
 
  Clustering Coefficient Average Path Length 
Contacts 0.41 4.75 
Contacts + Shortcuts 0.42 2.79 
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Figure 6  9/11 Pilot clique identification 
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3.5.6 BEWTEENNESS  
Narayanan (2005) defines Betweenness in his thesis.  He defines the following 
“Betweenness is a centrality measure of a vertex within a graph Vertices that occur on 
many shortest paths between other vertices have higher between’s than those that do not” 
We are concerned with a measure called betweenness centrality. The vertex betweenness 
centrality BC(v) of a vertex v ∈ V is the sum over all pairs of vertices u, w ∈ V , of the 
fraction of shortest paths between u and w that pass through v: 
 
Where σuw(v) denotes the total number of shortest path between u and w that pass 
through vertex v and σuw denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w. 
 
Where σuw(e) denotes the total number of shortest path between u and w that pass 
through edge e and σuw denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w.   
In reference to Kinsella (2011) he focuses on the illicit arms trade and draws on a database 
named the “Illicit Arms Transfer Database”, which systematises information contained in 
journalistic reports on illicit small arms transfers.  The purpose of which is to reveal high 
profile positions occupied by former Soviet bloc countries in the illicit arms trade 
network.  He examines the Betweenness centrality calculations for Liberia‘s Illicit Arms 
Trade using UN reports documenting arms embargo violations. Individuals and 
transactions involved in four arms transfers from 1992 to 2002 are collated and examined. 
The SNA network contains 38 people that include arms brokers, arms transportation 
vendors, arms purchasers including Liberian president Charles Taylor and his son 
Chuckie. The Inbetweenness network illustrated in figure 7 below clearly shows Viktor 
Bout, the high-profile Russian, arms broker and transporter now in U.S. prison for arms 
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trafficking as the actor with the highest Betweenness centrality score. He states that 
“Brokers” or “transport agents” have a highest level of Betweenness centrality. 
Furthermore he elaborates on that by stating “A closely related SNA concept useful for the 
study of illicit arms trade networks is brokerage. Brokers, in network analytic terms, are 
nodes positioned on directional path network. Analysts have gone on to specify particular 
brokerage roles based on the actors ‘membership in groups or other attribute categories. 
For instance, a node occupies a coordinator role when it is interposed between nodes 
within its same group or organization; when the three nodes are members of different 
groups, the broker acts as a liaison .Other brokerage roles are defined when the broker 
and one actor are members of one group and the other actor is a member of a second 
group: brokers that mediate inflows into their group are gatekeepers; those that mediate 
outflows from their own group are representatives. Identifying important brokers in a 
social network involves counting the number of triads in which that node is positioned as 
an intermediary between nonadjacent nodes. Naturally, they tend to have high 
betweenness scores.  
 
Figure 7 Liberia’s Illicit Arms Trade betweeness centrality Kinsella (2011) 
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Inserting a concealed financial broker into an online financial community now becomes a 
interesting prospect. The impact of which may potentially cause a ripple effect in terms of 
stock price movement from brokered online chat or communication. 
Looking at figure 8 and the results in table 3 calculated by Krebs (2002) in terms of 
betweeeness, it came as no great shock that once the degrees, betweenness and closeness 
were calculated Mohamed Atta was identified as the leader. Looking at the analysis 
written by Thomas A. Stewart in his article “The Six Degrees of Mohamed Atta” he states 
“According to three measures. One is "degrees," or activity, which measures the number 
of times someone contacts others in the network. A second is "betweenness." For example, 
there appears to have been no direct link between Abdulaziz Alomari and Ziad Jarrah; 
Atta and Marwan , Al-Shehhi stood between them. The more often someone is in that 
"between" position, the more control he exercises in the network. The third attribute is 
"closeness," which measures the extent to which a person has direct contact with others, 
with no go between, this is another clue to how important an individual is to a network. 
3.5.7 CLOSENESS 
Closeness is preferred in network analysis to mean shortest-path length, as it gives higher 
values to more central vertices, and so is usually positively associated with other measures 
such as degree. In the network theory, closeness is a sophisticated measure of centrality. It 
is defined as the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all 
other vertices reachable from it: 
Morris T (2012) defines “Closeness is a measure to understand where individual nodes lie 
between other nodes in the network. Closeness reflects another way of understanding the 
relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text and over time. 
Examining the closeness between nodes takes into account the connectivity of the node's 
neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the shortest paths to other nodes 
in the network”  
The closeness metric does not feature in any of the experiments. 
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Figure 8 Detailed 9/11 Hijacker network (Krebs 2002) 
Table 3 shows the Betweeness and Closeness SNA calculations below. 
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Degrees 
* possible false ID 
Betweenness Closeness 
0.361 Mohamed Atta 0.588 
Mohamed 
Atta 
0.587 
Mohamed 
Atta 
0.295 Marwan Al-Shehhi 0.252 
Essid Sami 
Ben Khemais 
0.466 
Marwan Al-
Shehhi 
0.213 Hani Hanjour 0.232 
Zacarias 
Moussaoui 
0.445 Hani Hanjour 
0.180 
Essid Sami Ben 
Khemais 
0.154 
Nawaf 
Alhazmi 
0.442 
Nawaf 
Alhazmi 
0.180 Nawaf Alhazmi 0.126 Hani Hanjour 0.436 
Ramzi Bin al-
Shibh 
0.164 Ramzi Bin al-Shibh 0.105 
Djamal 
Beghal 
0.436 
Zacarias 
Moussaoui 
0.164 Ziad Jarrah 0.088 
Marwan Al-
Shehhi 
0.433 
Essid Sami 
Ben Khemais 
0.148 Abdul Aziz Al-Omari* 0.050 
Satam 
Suqami 
0.424 
Abdul Aziz 
Al-Omari* 
0.131 Djamal Beghal 0.048 
Ramzi Bin al-
Shibh 
0.424 Ziad Jarrah 
0.131 Fayez Ahmed 0.043 Abu Qatada 0.409 
Imad Eddin 
Barakat 
Yarkas 
0.131 Salem Alhazmi* 0.034 
Tarek 
Maaroufi 
0.409 
Satam 
Suqami 
0.131 Satam Suqami 0.033 
Mamoun 
Darkazanli 
0.407 Fayez Ahmed 
0.131 Zacarias Moussaoui 0.029 
Imad Eddin 
Barakat 
Yarkas 
0.404 Lotfi Raissi 
0.115 Hamza Alghamdi 0.026 Fayez Ahmed 0.401 Wail Alshehri 
0.115 Said Bahaji 0.023 Abdul Aziz 0.399 Ahmed Al 
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Al-Omari* Haznawi 
0.098 Khalid Al-Mihdhar 0.022 
Hamza 
Alghamdi 
0.399 Said Bahaji 
0.098 Saeed Alghamdi* 0.017 Ziad Jarrah 0.391 
Agus 
Budiman 
0.098 Tarek Maaroufi 0.015 
Ahmed Al 
Haznawi 
0.391 
Zakariya 
Essabar 
0.098 Wail Alshehri 0.013 
Salem 
Alhazmi* 
0.389 
Mamoun 
Darkazanli 
0.098 Wail Alshehri 0.013 
Salem 
Alhazmi* 
0.389 
Mamoun 
Darkazanli 
0.098 Waleed Alshehri 0.012 Lotfi Raissi 0.389 
Mounir El 
Motassadeq 
0.082 Abu Qatada 0.012 
Saeed 
Alghamdi* 
0.389 
Mustafa 
Ahmed al-
Hisawi 
0.082 Agus Budiman 0.011 
Agus 
Budiman 
0.372 
Abdelghani 
Mzoudi 
0.082 Ahmed Alghamdi 0.007 
Ahmed 
Alghamdi 
0.372 
Ahmed Khalil 
Al-Ani 
0.082 Lotfi Raissi 0.007 
Ahmed 
Ressam 
0.365 
Salem 
Alhazmi* 
0.082 Zakariya Essabar 0.007 
Haydar Abu 
Doha 
0.361 
Hamza 
Alghamdi 
0.066 Ahmed Al Haznawi 0.006 
Kamel 
Daoudi 
0.343 Abu Qatada 
0.066 
Imad Eddin Barakat 
Yarkas 
0.006 
Khalid Al-
Mihdhar 
0.343 
Tarek 
Maaroufi 
0.066 Jerome Courtaillier 0.004 
Mohamed 
Bensakhria 
0.339 
Ahmed 
Alghamdi 
0.066 Kamel Daoudi 0.003 
Nabil al-
Marabh 
0.335 
Waleed 
Alshehri 
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0.066 Majed Moqed 0.002 
Jerome 
Courtaillier 
0.332 
Djamal 
Beghal 
0.066 Mamoun Darkazanli 0.002 
Mustafa 
Ahmed al-
Hisawi 
0.332 
Khalid Al-
Mihdhar 
0.066 Mohamed Bensakhria 0.002 Said Bahaji 0.332 
Saeed 
Alghamdi* 
0.066 Mounir El Motassadeq 0.002 Wail Alshehri 0.328 Majed Moqed 
0.066 
Mustafa Ahmed al-
Hisawi 
0.001 Abu Walid 0.324 
Ahmed 
Ressam 
0.066 Nabil al-Marabh 0.001 
Mehdi 
Khammoun 
0.323 
Ahmed 
Alnami 
0.066 
Rayed Mohammed 
Abdullah 
0.001 
Mohand 
Alshehri* 
0.323 
Nabil al-
Marabh 
0.049 Abdussattar Shaikh 0.001 Raed Hijazi 0.321 
Haydar Abu 
Doha 
0.049 Abu Walid 0.001 
Rayed 
Mohammed 
Abdullah 
0.319 
Mohamed 
Bensakhria 
0.049 Ahmed Alnami 0.001 
Waleed 
Alshehri 
0.316 
Essoussi 
Laaroussi 
0.049 Haydar Abu Doha 0.000 
Abdelghani 
Mzoudi 
0.316 
Jerome 
Courtaillier 
0.049 Mehdi Khammoun 0.000 
Abdussattar 
Shaikh 
0.316 
Kamel 
Daoudi 
0.049 Osama Awadallah 0.000 Abu Zubeida 0.316 
Seifallah ben 
Hassine 
0.049 Raed Hijazi 0.000 
Ahmed 
Alnami 
0.314 
Rayed 
Mohammed 
Abdullah 
0.033 Ahmed Ressam 0.000 
Ahmed Khalil 
Al-Ani 
0.313 Raed Hijazi 
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0.033 Bandar Alhazmi 0.000 
Bandar 
Alhazmi 
0.311 
Abdussattar 
Shaikh 
0.033 David Courtaillier 0.000 
David 
Courtaillier 
0.311 
Bandar 
Alhazmi 
0.033 Essoussi Laaroussi 0.000 
Essoussi 
Laaroussi 
0.311 
Faisal Al 
Salmi 
0.033 Faisal Al Salmi 0.000 
Faisal Al 
Salmi 
0.311 
Mohand 
Alshehri* 
0.033 Lased Ben Heni 0.000 
Faisal Al 
Salmi 
0.311 
Osama 
Awadallah 
0.033 Mohammed Belfas 0.000 
Jean-Marc 
Grandvisir 
0.308 
Mehdi 
Khammoun 
0.033 Mohand Alshehri* 0.000 
Lased Ben 
Heni 
0.308 
Mohamed 
Abdi 
0.033 Seifallah ben Hassine 0.000 
Madjid 
Sahoune 
0.307 
David 
Courtaillier 
0.016 Abdelghani Mzoudi 0.000 Majed Moqed 0.307 
Mohammed 
Belfas 
0.016 Abu Zubeida 0.000 
Mamduh 
Mahmud 
Salim 
0.305 
Lased Ben 
Heni 
0.016 Ahmed Khalil Al-Ani 0.000 
Mohamed 
Abdi 
0.303 
Fahid al 
Shakri 
0.016 Fahid al Shakri 0.000 
Mohammed 
Belfas 
0.303 
Madjid 
Sahoune 
0.016 Jean-Marc Grandvisir 0.000 
Mounir El 
Motassadeq 
0.303 Samir Kishk 
0.016 Madjid Sahoune 0.000 Nizar Trabelsi 0.281 
Mamduh 
Mahmud 
Salim 
0.016 Mamduh Mahmud Salim 0.000 
Osama 
Awadallah 
0.264 Abu Walid 
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0.016 Mohamed Abdi 0.000 Samir Kishk 0.250 Abu Zubeida 
0.016 Nizar Trabelsi 0.000 
Seifallah ben 
Hassine 
0.250 
Jean-Marc 
Grandvisir 
0.016 Samir Kishk 0.000 
Zakariya 
Essabar 
0.250 Nizar Trabelsi 
            
0.081 Average 0.032 Average 0.052 Average 
0.289 Centralization 0.565 Centralization 0.482 Centralization 
 
Table 3: 9/11 Hijacker Betweenness and closeness 
3.5.8 MODULARITY  
The modularity measurement is basically calculating the number of edges within the 
communities minus the expected number of such edges Modularity is defined on a 
partition of the nodes in a graph. Let  be an undirected graph modeling a social 
network with n nodes and m edges. Assume that each node  belongs to community cv. 
We define the indicator function  if and only if , i.e.,  are in the 
same community, and otherwise  for two nodes . The 
modularity  ‘of this specific community partition is 
 
Where  is the adjacency matrix of  with  if  and 0 otherwise, du 
and dv are degrees of u and v respectively. 
According to Newman (2006) many networks of interest in the sciences, including a 
variety of social and biological networks, are found to divide naturally into communities 
or modules. The problem of detecting and characterising this community structure has 
attracted considerable recent attention. One such metric is the modularity measure 
proposed by Newman. Modularity is then a measure of the fraction of intra-community 
edges minus the expected value of the same quantity in a network with the same 
community divisions, but with edges placed without regard for communities. Mislove 
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(2009) defines the following: “Modularity therefore ranges from -1 to 1, with 0 
representing no more community structure than would be expected in a random graph, 
and significantly positive values representing the presence of community structure. In 
practice, modularity over 0.3 or higher is observed in real-world networks with significant 
community structure”. Merely the finding that a network contains tightly-knit groups at all 
can convey useful information: a network contains tightly-knit groups at all can convey 
useful information: One of the objectives Weinstein et al (2009) aimed to achieve was to 
employ social network analysis (SNA) algorithms as a filtering step to divide the Jihad 
group Jemaah Islamiyah into distinct communities from the September 2004 bombing of 
the Australian embassy in Jakarta atrocity. They used the Newman modularity community 
detection SNA algorithms.  The experiment used community detection on the simulated 
graph, detected communities were searched and the community with the highest number 
of terror cell actors, who, for the purposes of this experiment, were known in advance. 
This detected a number of terrorist clutter actors in a particular community. Each clutter 
actor represents a false alarm, and each terrorist actor represents a positive detection. 
Given those counts, this allowed to precision calculations and recall measures on the 
detected community Results also indicated that for smaller graphs the community 
detection performs quite well with high precision scores. However, as the graph gets 
larger, precision scores begin to drop dramatically. However when examining 
communities in networks, one often requires an objective metric to evaluate how “good” a 
particular division of the network into communities is. 
 
3.5.9 DIAMETER AND RADIUS 
Mislove (2009) states in his thesis, the radius and diameter of a graph, which represents 
how far away nodes, are from each other in the network. First, the eccentricity of a node v 
is the maximal shortest path distance between v and any other node. The radius of a graph 
is then the minimum eccentricity across all vertices, and the diameter is the maximum 
eccentricity across all vertices. Thus, the radius represents the maximal distance from the 
most “central” node in the graph to all other nodes, and the diameter represents the 
maximal distance from the least “central” node in the graph to all other nodes. Due to the 
computational complexity associated with determining the actual radius and diameter, the 
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radius and diameter of a graph is often estimated by calculating the eccentricity of a large 
random sample of nodes in the network. In such cases, the diameter should be viewed as a 
lower bound of the true diameter, and the radius as an upper bound of the true radius. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
SNA metrics provide a useful insight into how networks evolve, who the main influencers 
are as it focuses on interaction rather than behaviour. The literature identifies an array of 
disciplines the methodology can be applied too. Whilst It is helpful to understand how an 
online financial community and terrorist community network evolve and be able illustrate 
how it can be destabilised using the six degrees of separation theory. It maybe more 
helpful, however, to understand how a network conscripts participants and why people 
wish to join terrorist or online financial community’s networks.  
From the literature review the main limitation of social network analysis is the same that 
applies to any new and innovative technology: social network analysis is just one tool that 
can be used to understand   networks and communities, and is just one piece of the jigsaw. 
Text mining is another tool that can be used in conjunction with same It  is true to state 
that networks be that online financial networks or  terrorist groups, share striking 
similarities in regards to centrality inbetweenness and modularity.  Despite their non-
hierarchical approach, most networks are not completely organised in a network structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
CHAPTER 4 
4 EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY: STATISTICAL TEST AND DATA 
MINING MODELS  
The literature review considered the SNA metrics existing techniques and research used 
within the field. Chapter 4 will portray the data mining and prediction techniques used to 
formalise the approach taken. These methods were used to perform the basic operations of 
data mining such as predictive analysis and descriptive analysis. The predictive analysis 
involves looking at the past history with the intent to predict future behavior. Description 
analysis looks at deviation and similarity based analysis. The process used for the data 
extraction follows the basics Knowledge Discovery in databases (KDD) which is 
concerned with finding useful information and patterns in databases and the use of 
algorithms is used via the Weka application to extract patterns derived from the KDD 
process. 
4.1 GINI INDEX 
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution, and in this thesis is 
applied to the distribution of messages posted by users. It is defined as a ratio with values 
between 0 and 1: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution 
and the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the area under the uniform 
distribution line. It was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini and published in 
his 1912 paper "Variabilità e mutabilità" ("Variability and Mutability"). 
The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage, and is equal to the Gini 
coefficient multiplied by 100. (The Gini coefficient is equal to half of the relative mean 
difference.)  The Gini coefficient can also be used to measure wealth equality and 
inequality. This use requires that no one has a negative net wealth. It is also commonly 
used for the measurement of discriminatory power of rating systems in the credit risk 
management. The Gini coefficient is defined as a ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve 
diagram. The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution 
function. If the area between the line of perfect equality and Lorenz curve is A, and  the 
area under the Lorenz curve is B, then the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B).  
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If the Lorenz curve is represented by the function Y = L(X), the value of B can be found 
with integration and 
  ∫  ( )   
 
 
 
 
4.2 PAIRED TEST 
A paired t-test compares two samples in cases where each value in one sample has a 
natural partner in the other. A paired t-test looks at the difference between paired values ( 
the mean values) in two samples, takes into account the variation ( Standard deviation) of 
values within each sample, and produces a single number known as a t-value. Considering 
that the experiments are taking pre and post data sets before geopolitical events the pair 
test will outline the longitudinal differences between both sets of data. The paired test 
formula is as follows:  
       
  ̅̅ ̅    ̅̅ ̅
√  
 
  
  
 
 
 
Where   ̅̅ ̅ is the mean of the first dataset,   ̅̅ ̅ is the mean of the second dataset,    is the 
standard deviation of the first dataset,     is the standard deviation of the second dataset 
and   is the size of the dataset. In our experiments we will have n=154 elements (i.e.22 
geopolitical events multiplied by 7 stocks = 154 elements). In order to understand the t-
value corresponding to a certain confidence level the student’s t-value distribution (see 
Table 4) is used. For a 90% confidence rating, referring the table 4, a t-value of 1.301 is 
required when N > 45, while a t-value of 1.679 is needed for a confidence level of 0.95% 
and 2.41 for a 0.99% confidence level. The computation of the paired testes will be 
calculated using Network X. 
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Table 4: T – Value confidence rating table 
4.3 DECISION TREES USED FOR PREDICTION MODELS 
Sas (2012) states that Decision trees are a simple, but a powerful form of multiple variable 
analyses. They provide unique capabilities to supplement, complement, and substitute for 
a variety of data mining tools and techniques and statistical intelligence. Decision trees are 
produced by algorithms that identify various ways of splitting a data set into branch-like 
segments. These segments form an inverted decision tree that originates with a root node 
at the top of the tree. The object of analysis is reflected in this root node as a simple, one-
dimensional display in the decision tree interface. The name of the field of data that is the 
object of analysis is usually displayed, along with the spread or distribution of the values 
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that are contained in that field. The display of this node reflects all the data set records, 
fields, and field values that are found in the object of analysis. The discovery of the 
decision rule to form the branches or segments underneath the root node is based on a 
method that extracts the relationship between the object of analysis (that serves as the 
target field in the data) and one or more fields that serve as input fields to create the 
branches or segments. The values in the input field are used to estimate the likely value in 
the target field. The target field is also called an outcome, response, or dependent field or 
variable. To create a decision tree a list of variables for input is needed this is located in 
appendix B. The experiment will use the open source platform Weka using the J48 
algorithm. 
4.4 THE CONFUSION MATRIX 
A confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost, 1998) contains information about actual and 
predicted classifications done by a classification system. Performance of such systems is 
commonly evaluated using the data in the matrix. The following table shows the confusion 
matrix for a two class classifier.  
 
Table 5: The Confusion Matrix 
Based on the data contained in the confusion matrix, several performance indicators can 
be defined. The most common performance indicators used are precision, recall and the F-
measure, defined as follows: 
Recall = 
  
     
 
Precision = 
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F = 2.  
                
                
 
In order to explain the meaning of these three metrics, we refer to how they are used in the 
field of information retrieval. If we have a set of records in a database and a set of records 
to be retrieved by a search engine, in most of the cases the set returned by the search 
engine may not fully match the set of relevant records.  
Recall in information retrieval is the fraction of the documents that are relevant to the 
query that are successfully retrieved. That means that we have maximum recall if all the 
relevant documents were retrieved. However, even non-relevant documents might have 
been retrieved. In order to test the quality of the retrieval, the precision is also needed. 
Precision is the fraction of retrieved documents that are relevant to the find that means that 
in order to have high precision, if 10 documents are retrieved, all of the 10 are relevant 
(but the recall could be low, meaning that there were more than 10 relevant documents). 
The F measures accuracy mixing the statistics precision p and recall r. Precision is the 
ratio of true positives (tp) to all predicted positives (tp + fp). Recall is the ratio of true 
positives to all actual positives (tp + fn). Thence the F score is     
 F = 2. 
         
                
        where p = 
  
     
           
  
     
  
4.5 PYTHON PARSER 
A Python parser is used to get a list of messages from the online financial communities 
within Yahoo Finance. This is used to create the networks and compute the SNA metrics 
of the associated actors from each stock forum on Yahoo Finance. A Python library 
known as Network X is used in the computation. 
4.6 WEKA 
Weka is open source software that was used for the predictive modeling in this thesis. 
Weka uses a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining and data 
prediction. The algorithms can either be applied directly to a dataset or called from your 
own Java code. The application requires a preformatted file pertaining to the experimental 
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data for input into the application. Weka contains tools for data pre-processing, 
classification, regression, clustering, association rules, and visualisation. Appendix A 
contains the file used for the experiments. 
4.7 GEPHI 
Visualisation plays an important role in SNA, for illustration and exploration purposes 
alone, the visualisation of SNA content allows the examiners to analyse and manipulate 
the network in the most effective manor and means.  Gephi is open source software for 
graph and network analysis. It uses a 3D render engine to display large networks in real-
time and to speed up the exploration. A flexible multi task architecture brings new 
possibilities to work with, complex data sets and produce valuable visual results Bastian 
(2009) Pajek is another open software application, however it’s widely believed that the 
Gephi application is a more powerful application. Typically results are displayed in 
graphic format with graphs that consist of nodes to represent actors and lines on the 
network. The Gephi application was used to create the network diagrams on this thesis. 
4.8 NETWORKX 
NetworkX is a python language software package for the creation, manipulation, and 
study of the structure, dynamics, and functions of complex networks. With NetworkX you 
can load and store networks in standard and nonstandard data formats, generate many 
types of random and classic networks, analyse network structure, build network models, 
design new network algorithms, draw networks, and much more ( NetworkX) 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 EXPERIMENT INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a set of experiments performed to test the reaction of online 
communities and the stock market to geopolitical events related to conflicts and 
international crisis. 
Three experiments were undertaken. The first experiment tests how online communities of 
investors talking about stocks operating in the military sector change before and after a 
geopolitical event. In order to do so, a build of online investors’ networks is required and 
the metrics of different networks such as density, modularity and centralisation will be 
compared by mean of a statistical test. 
The second experiment is concerned with the examination of how prices of military 
related stocks change in reaction to geopolitical events. In particular, we compare the price 
of these stocks before and after the event in order to understand if stock prices are 
sensitive to such events, and we also compare the price change with the S&P 500 index to 
understand the behavior of such stocks relatively to the market benchmark.  
Finally, in the last experiment a decision tree predictive model is used to investigate if the 
prices of military stocks a week after a geopolitical event could be predicted by using a set 
of features encompassing the past prices of each stock and a set of SNA metrics gathered 
from online community’s activity relevant to each stock. 
5.1 DATASET 
This section describes the dataset collected and used in the three experiments of this 
chapter. The naming convention and notation are also introduced. 
5.1.1 MILITARY STOCKS 
The inception point was to select a number of stocks operating in the defense and military 
sector. These are mainly medium and big capitalisation manufacturing companies with a 
strong R&D department. 
We call   the set of stocks identified.   contains 7 US military stocks, each of them 
identified by its market ticker. For instance, we use the symbol      to refer to the stock 
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United Technologies. The stocks are listed in table 6. The column capitalisation contains 
the capitalisation of each stock in billions of dollars, while the percentage in parenthesis is 
the relative size of each stock over the total capitalisation of all the seven stocks. The 
seven military stocks have a total capitalisation of about $300 billion, which represents 
about 2% of the total capitalisation of the S&P 500 index, estimated at about $15 trillion 
in July 2014. 
Stock Ticker Capitalisation Description 
Honeywell 
International 
HOC 74.7B $ 
(24.84%) 
Honeywell International Inc. operates as a 
diversified technology and manufacturing 
company worldwide. Its Aerospace segment 
provides turbine propulsion engines, 
auxiliary power units, environmental control 
and electric power systems, engine controls, 
flight safety, communications, navigation, 
radar and surveillance systems, and aircraft 
lighting products for aircraft manufacturers, 
airlines, business and general aviation, 
military, space, and airport operations, as 
well as offers management and technical, 
logistics, aircraft wheels and brakes, and 
repair and overhaul services 
United 
Technologies 
UTX 100.34B $ 
(33.37%) 
 
United Technologies Corporation provides 
technology products and services to the 
building systems and aerospace industries 
worldwide. It also offers electronic security 
products, including intruder alarms, access 
control systems, and video surveillance 
systems; and monitoring, response, and 
security personnel services.. Its Pratt & 
Whitney segment supplies aircraft engines 
for commercial, military, business jet, and 
general aviation markets, as well as provides 
fleet management services for commercial 
engines. The company’s UTC Aerospace 
Systems segment supplies aerospace 
products. Its Sikorsky segment manufactures 
military and commercial helicopters, as well 
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as provides aftermarket helicopter and 
aircraft parts and services. 
L-3 
Communication 
Holding 
LLL 9.42B $ 
(3.14%) 
L-3 Communications Corporation, provides 
command, control, communications, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C3ISR) systems; aircraft modernisation and 
maintenance; and national security solutions 
in the United States and internationally. The 
company operates in four segments: 
Aerospace Systems, Electronic Systems, 
Communication Systems, and National 
Security Solutions. It offers a range of 
products and services, including components, 
products, subsystems, and systems, as well as 
related services to military and commercial 
customers in various business areas.  
Lockheed 
Martin 
Corporation 
LMT 55.7B $ 
(18.51%) 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, a security and 
aerospace company, is engaged in the 
research, design, development, manufacture, 
integration, and sustainment of advanced 
technology systems, products, and services 
for defense, civil, and commercial 
applications in United States and 
internationally. The company operates in five 
segments: Aeronautics, Information Systems 
& Global Solutions, Missiles and Fire 
Control, Mission Systems and Training, and 
Space Systems. The Aeronautics segment 
offers military aircrafts, such as combat and 
air mobility aircrafts, unmanned air vehicles, 
and related technologies. The Missiles and 
Fire Control segment offers air and missile 
defense systems; tactical missiles and air-to-
ground precision strike weapon systems; 
logistics and other technical services; fire 
control systems; and manned and unmanned 
ground vehicles.  
Alliant ATK 4.1B $ Alliant Techsystems Inc. develops and 
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Technologies (1.4%) produces aerospace, defense, and commercial 
products to the U.S. government, allied 
nations, and prime contractors in the United 
States, and internationally. It supplies 
ammunition, firearms, and shooting 
accessories. The Aerospace Group segment 
offers rocket motor systems for human and 
cargo launch vehicles, conventional and 
strategic missiles, missile defense 
interceptors, small and micro-satellites, 
satellite components, structures and 
subsystems, lightweight space deployables, 
solar arrays, decoy and illuminating flares, 
and aircraft countermeasures. The Defense 
Group segment provides military small, 
medium, and large caliber ammunition; 
propulsion systems for tactical missiles and 
missile defense applications; strike weapons; 
precision munitions; gun systems; aircraft 
survivability systems; fuses and warheads; 
energetic materials; and special mission 
aircraft.  
Northrop 
Grumman 
Corporation 
NOC 26.5B $ 
(8.81%) 
Northrop Grumman Corporation provides 
systems, products, and solutions in 
aerospace, electronics, information systems, 
and technical service areas to government 
and commercial customers worldwide. The 
company’s Aerospace Systems segment 
designs, develops, integrates, and produces 
manned aircraft, unmanned systems, 
spacecraft, high-energy laser systems, 
microelectronics, and other systems and 
subsystems. This segment sells its products 
primarily to government agencies for use in 
various mission areas. Its Electronic Systems 
segment offers solutions for sensing, 
understanding, anticipating, and controlling 
operating environment to military, civil, and 
commercial customers. This segment’s 
solutions comprise defense electronics and 
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systems, airborne fire control radars, 
situational awareness systems, early warning 
systems, airspace management systems, 
navigation systems, communications 
systems, marine power and propulsion 
systems, space systems, and logistics 
services. 
Raytheon Co. RTN 30.1B $ 
(10.1%) 
Raytheon Company develops integrated 
products, services, and solutions in the areas 
of sensing; effects; command, control, 
communications, and intelligence; mission 
support; and cyber and information security 
worldwide. It operates in four segments: 
Integrated Defense Systems; Intelligence, 
Information, and Services; Missile Systems; 
and Space and Airborne Systems. The 
Integrated Defense Systems segment 
provides integrated air and missile defense; 
radar solutions; naval combat and ship 
electronic systems; command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence 
solutions; and air traffic management 
systems. The Intelligence, Information, and 
Services segment offers a range of technical 
and professional services, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation, 
DoD space and weather solutions, 
cybersecurity, analytics, training, logistics, 
mission support. The Missile Systems 
segment develops and supports a range of 
weapon systems, including missiles, smart 
munitions, close-in weapon systems, 
projectiles, kinetic kill vehicles and combat 
sensor solutions.  
 
Table 6: List of military stocks 
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5.1.2 GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS  
A number of geopolitical events were collected related to global conflicts, war or political 
instability of recent years. We call the set of events  , and a specific event ∈  . Each 
event is represented by a date, the conflict it belongs to and the text of the news associated 
with the event. News is supposed to be market-sensitive, especially for military stocks, 
and supposed to trigger a reaction on the online communities of investors.  There was a 
large amount of geopolitical events gathering pertaining to 10 conflicts. The data set was 
condensed down to 22 geo-political events from three recent conflicts: the Libyan 
rebellion during the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war and the Ukraine crisis. The time 
interval of the events goes from the beginning of 2011 to April 2014. The British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News was used as the source for collecting the data. 
ID 
Date Conflict Event News 
1 16/02/2011 Libya 
Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi Arrest of 
human rights activist triggers demonstrations in Libya's 
second largest city 
2 22/02/2011 Libya 
NATO to take control in Libya after US, UK and France 
reach agreement Britain, France and the US have agreed that 
NATO will take over the military command of the no-fly  
zone over Libya in a move that represents a setback for 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who had hoped to diminish the role of the 
alliance. 
3 24/03/2011 Libya 
Libyan plane and tanks destroyed by allied jets French 
fighter jets have destroyed a Libyan plane in the coastal city 
of Misrata in the first enforcement of the no-fly zone 
imposed by the UN to try to halt Muammar Gaddafi's anti-
rebel offensive. 
4 21/04/2011 Libya Drones can be used by NATO forces in Libya, says Obama 
5 27/06/2011 Libya 
War crimes court issues Gaddafi arrest warrant ICC orders 
Libyan leader and his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to stand trial 
on charges of torturing and killing civilians and rebels 
 
6 30/06/2011 Libya 
Boeing projects $300M overrun on tanker project. 
7 29/06/2011 Libya 
France admits arming rebels. NATO is reviewing the 
conduct of its military campaign in Libya after France 
admitted arming rebel fighters in apparent defiance of the 
UN mandate. 
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8 03/03/2014 Ukraine 
Russia's parliament approves Vladimir Putin's request to use 
force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests. Pro-Russian 
rallies are held in several Ukrainian cities outside Crimea, 
including the second-biggest city Kharkiv. Barack Obama 
tells Mr Putin to pull forces back to bases. 
 Ukraine's interim PM Yatsenyuk says Russia has effectively 
declared war. US says Russia is in control of Crimea. 
"Black Monday" on Russian stock markets as reports 
suggests Russia's military had issued a deadline for 
Ukrainian forces in Crimea to surrender. The reports are 
later denied. Russia's UN envoy says toppled President 
Yanukovych had asked the Russian president in writing for 
use of force. 
9 07/03/2014 Ukraine 
7/8/9/10th March 2014: Russia says it will support Crimea if 
the region votes to leave Ukraine. Russia's state gas 
company Gazprom warns Kiev that its gas supply might be 
cut off.  The US and France warn of "new measures" against 
Russia if it does not withdraw its forces from Ukraine. 
Warning shots are fired at international monitors trying to 
enter Crimea. Armed men seize a military hospital in 
Simferopol. 
 
10 11/03/2014 Ukraine 
The European Commission offers Ukraine trade incentives 
worth nearly 500m euros ($694m; £417m). Ukrainian MPs 
ask the US and UK to use all measures, including military, to 
stop Russia's aggression. 
11 13/03/2014 Ukraine 
Barack Obama pledges to stand with Ukraine during a 
meeting with interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk at 
the White House. 
12 30/04/2014 Ukraine 
Acting President Olexander Turchynov reinstates 
conscription, warning Ukraine is on "full combat alert". Pro-
Russians take over the regional prosecutor's office in eastern 
Donetsk. 
13 15/03/2011 Syria 
Activists call for a "Day of Rage" across Syria, inspired by 
other popular uprisings across the Arab world. In February, 
several youths were arrested in the southern town of Daraa 
for writing graffiti calling for the downfall of the regime of 
President Bashar Assad. 
14 18/03/2011 Syria 
 Activists say five people were killed as security forces 
dispersed crowds in Daraa — one of several demonstrations 
across the country — in the first deadly violence reported in 
the uprising. Unrest spreads in coming months. 
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15 26/04/2011 Syria 
Thousands of soldiers backed by tanks and snipers open fire 
on civilians in Daraa and two other locations, according to 
witnesses. Armed security agents conduct house-to-house 
sweeps. Neighborhoods are sectioned off and checkpoints 
are erected. Electricity, water and cellphone services are cut. 
At least 11 people are killed and 14 others lay in the streets, 
either dead or gravely wounded 
16 18/05/2011 Syria 
U.S. imposes sanctions on Assad and senior Syrian officials 
for human rights abuses. 
17 05/08/2011 Syria 
The United States, Britain, France and Germany and the 
European Union demand Assad resign, saying he is unfit to 
lead. 
18 6/10/2011 Syria 
Russia and China veto a European-backed U.N. Security 
Council resolution that threatens sanctions against Syria if it 
doesn't immediately halt its military crackdown against 
civilians. 
19 23/12/2011 Syria 
Back-to-back car bombs near Syria's intelligence agencies in 
Damascus kill at least 44 in first major attack in the heart of 
the capital. Syria's state-run TV blames Al-Qaeda militants. 
20 04/02/2012 Syria 
Russia and China veto a resolution in the U.N. Security 
Council that backs an Arab League plan calling for Assad to 
step down. The double-veto outrages the U.S. and European 
council members who fear it will embolden Assad regime. 
21 20/08/2012 Syria 
Obama says U.S. will reconsider its opposition to military 
involvement in Syria if Assad's regime deploys or uses 
chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red 
line" for the United States 
22 3/12/2012 Syria 
Speaking of chemical weapons, Obama says Assad should 
know "if you make the tragic mistake of using these 
weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held 
accountable." 
 
Table 7: List of military stocks 
5.1.3 STOCK PRICES 
Historical prices of the stocks were collected in the set   and the value of the S&P 500 
index, used as the market benchmark in our experiments. Closing prices adjusted by 
dividends and splits were collected via a Bloomberg terminal. 
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Given a stock   and an event   ∈  , we use the following notation:    ( ) is the price of 
stock   at the date of event   , while    
  ( ) is the closing price of stock   after (or 
before)   days from the event. For instance, referring to the event id of table 7 and the 
tickers of table 6,    
  (   ) is the closing price of the stock UTX five days after the 
event    (a Libyan-related event happened on the 16
th
 of February 2011). 
The return of each stock (also called the gain of a stock) is expressed as a percentage in 
[0,1] and it is denoted by  . For istance,    
  ( ) is the gain of the stock   after (or before) 
  days from the event   . By definition it is: 
  
   
  ( )  
   
  ( )     ( )
   ( )
           
  ( )  
   ( )     
  ( )
   
  ( )
 
Stock prices follow a log-normal distribution, while stock returns follow a normal 
distribution. 
5.1.4 ONLINE COMMUNITIES DATA 
Online message board data was collected about online investors’ interactions from 2010 
till 2014. Our source of online communities’ data is represented by Yahoo! Finance 
Message Boards. 
Yahoo! Finance keeps a message board for each stock quoted on the US market. Each 
message board is a stream of threads opened by registered users. Each thread is a stream 
of messages posted by users. A user can decide to add a new message to a thread, answer 
to a message or open a new thread. 
A preexisting DIT parser using Python 2.7 programming language, the urllib library and 
regular expression was used for the message board extraction from the Yahoo Finance   
website.  The parser collected the discussions regarding the seven military stock of interest 
from 2010 till July 2014. Data was collected about the list of threads, the list of messages 
for each thread, the content of each message, time of the message, users and the citations 
between messages. Data collected by the parser was stored in a MySQL database. Table 8 
describes in details the data collected and it is an exact mapping of the database table used. 
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Field Description 
Message ID An incremental unique ID of each message posted 
Thread ID An incremental unique Id of each Thread opened 
Thread Title The title of the thread 
Message Timestamp Timestamp when the message was posted 
Message Content The text of the message 
Stock The stock message board the message refers to (one of the 
seven military stocks considered) 
User A unique username of the author of the message 
Message Quoted If the message is a response to another message, the field 
contains the ID of the message quoted. 
 
Table 8 Data collected from Yahoo! Finance Message Boards 
 
There was approximately 85,000 messages regarding the 7 stocks examined, written in 
about 9,500 threads by about 3,850 users. 
5.1.5 BUILDING A NETWORK OF INVESTORS 
Using the Message Board data described in Table 8, I was able to define a social network 
for each stock and a specific interval of time       . The nodes of the networks were 
represented by users positng a message in the interval of time, while an edge is drawn 
from node   to node   if user   quoted at least one message written by user  . 
The notation followed is the following. We call         ( ) the network of online users for 
the stock   built considering all the messages posted in the interval        . Since we are 
interested in the behaviour of online communities before and after a geopolitical event   , 
the social network of investors   days before an event    will be represented by the time 
interval            , where     is the timestamp of event   . In the same way, the network 
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d days after an event    is identified by the timestamp            . We use the shorter 
notation   
  ( ) and   
  ( ) to identify the network   days before and after an event   . 
 In order to describe each network , the SNA metrics described in Table 9 were 
computed. 
Indicator Description 
  ( ) Number of nodes in the networks, equal to the number of users 
active on the network 
  ( ) Number of edges of the networks, equal to the number of users 
cited 
 ( ) Density of the network   
 ( ) Freeman’s centralization of the network   
   ( ) Average in-betweennes centrality of the network   
   ( ) Newmann’s modularity of the network   
    ( ) The Gini index of the distribution of the number of messages 
posted by each user in the network. Low value of the Gini index 
are an indicator of messages equally spread over users and 
viceversa. Note how this indicator is not strictly speaking an SNA 
indicator 
Diameter(N) Diameter of the network   
 
Table 9 SNA indicators computed for each network. 
5.1.6 EXPERIMENT 1: TESTING ONLINE INVESTORS REACTION TO GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS 
This experiment wants to verify if the structure of the network of online investors is 
significantly modified by geopolitical events. In order to investigate the issue we defined, 
for each stock   in   and each event    a pair of networks: one including all the online 
community activity   days before the event (called the before network) and one including 
all the activity   days after the event (called the after network). Scope of the experiment is 
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to verify if there is a statistical difference between the SNA metrics of the before and after 
network. Therefore, we will perform a paired t-test for each metrics. 
In the experiment, we used a value of the number of days   equal to 2, 5 and 20 trading 
days (equal to 2 days, one week and one month), to test the reaction of the community at 
different time interval. 
Since we have a dataset of 22 events, 7 stocks and three different time interval (2,5 and 20 
days), we have collected a total of 462 before and 462 after networks. Figure 9 depicts one 
of the most common patterns identified between before and after networks. Usually, the 
after network is more centralised, with higher number of users and quotations and it is 
distributed around few central actors, while the before networks appears less united with a 
higher number of isolated nodes.  
 
  Before               After 
Figure 9: The network of online investors talking about UTX the week before and after 
Obama said U.S. will reconsider its opposition to military involvement in Syria (20
th
 
August 2012). The graph on the right has a higher number of nodes and links, it is more 
connected and the core actors of the network make it more centralised. 
The following tables show the results of a paired t-test performed between the before and 
after networks. We divided our results according to the size of the time interval considered 
(2, 5 and 20 days). 
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Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  T value Significance 
  ( ) 3.64 1.28 2.84 +++ 
  ( ) 3.21 1.6 1.99 ++ 
 ( ) 0.014 0.023 0.74 = 
 ( ) 0.048 0.032 1.74 ++ 
   ( ) 0.64 0.413 1.55 + 
   ( ) -0.164 0.104 -1.58 - 
    ( ) -0.037 0.056 -0.66 = 
   ( ) 1.12 0.82 1.36 + 
 
Table 10 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=2 
 
Table 10 illustrates the results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks 
with d=2 days. N= 154. The symbol +++ means statistical significance with a 0.99% 
confidence level and that the values of the after network are greater than the values of the 
before networks, ++ and + corresponds to a significance level of 0.95% and 0.90% 
respectively. The symbol ---, -- and – denotes statistical difference at 0.99, 0.95 and 0.90 
confidence level but where values of the before network are greater than ones of the after 
network. 
Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  T value Significance 
  ( ) 2.62 1.41 1.85 ++ 
  ( ) 1.72 1.83 0.93 = 
 ( ) 0.015 0.025 0.6 = 
 ( ) 0.047 0.031 1.52 + 
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   ( ) 0.625 0.452 1.38 + 
   ( ) -0.04 0.153 -0.26 = 
    ( ) -0.028 0.071 -0.39 = 
   ( ) 0.89 1.01 0.88 = 
 
Table 11 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=5 days 
 
Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  T value Significance 
  ( ) -0.46 1.38 -0.33 = 
  ( ) -0.86 1.94 -0.44 = 
 ( ) 0.013 0.028 0.45 = 
 ( ) 0.028 0.054 0.518 = 
   ( ) 0.34 0.493 0.689 = 
   ( ) -0.104 0.194 -0.536 = 
    ( ) -0.059 0.0626 -0.94 = (- with cl 
80%) 
   ( ) -0.43 0.89 -0.48 = 
 
Table 12 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=20 
days 
5.1.7 EXPERIMENT 1: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Tables 10, 11, and 12 show a clear trend. When we consider the period immediately after 
a geopolitical event ( =2 days), the majority of the SNA metrics except density, 
modularity and Gini index  are significantly higher in the after network than in the before 
network. Based on experimental results, we can conclude that during the two days 
following a geopolitical event the following happens: 
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 More online users are talking about military stocks, as evidenced by the high 
increase in the number of nodes in the after network (t-value = 2.84, 0.99 
confidence level) 
 These users are interacting more, as evidenced by the high increase in the number 
of edges in the after network (t-value=1.99). This behaviour could be interpreted 
as an increased collective effort of the users to join strengths together and try to 
discuss and make sense of the consequences of the recent event. Casnici et al 
(2014) call this behaviour joint-attention of online investors. 
 The centralisation and average in-betweennes centrality of the after networks 
increase significantly. This means that in the after networks there are a group of 
actors with high importance in the network, acting as hubs and central point of 
reference during the discussion. This could be interpreted as the presence of a 
small group of authoritative users that take centre stage when there is something 
potentially critical to discuss 
 In accordance with this, the modularisation of the network is significantly lower in 
the after network. This means that the network is less segregated in sub-
communities and it is more centralised into one big discussion. However, on an 
absolute scale the values of modularity before and after are low (less than 0.25) 
meaning that in general the networks of online investors show little segregation. 
 The graph density is not significantly changed, even if it is higher in the after 
networks, while the Gini index of the distribution of messages per user is not 
significantly different but it is lower in the after network. We remind how the Gini 
index measures the inequality of a distribution, and a low Gini value is an index of 
a more uniform and “democratic” distribution. Therefore, there is a tendency in 
the after network to host a more democratic discussion where more users have the 
possibility to interact. 
When the period of observation increases, ( =5 or  =20 days), this effect fades quickly. 5 
days networks the number of nodes, the centralisation and in-betweennes are still 
significantly higher in the after network, meaning that the discussions after an event are 
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still bigger and more centralised after 1 week. In the 20 days network there is no statistical 
difference, meaning that after 1 month from the event online discussions do not differ 
significantly. The highest t-value is represented by the Gini index, lower in the after 
network, suggesting again how discussions after an event have a tendency to be more 
democratic. 
5.1.8 EXPERIMENT 2: MARKET REACTIONS TO GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS 
In this experiment we test if the price of the seven military stocks after a geopolitical event 
differs significantly from the price before the event. Moreover, we also compare the price 
change of the military stocks with the S&P 500 index, in order to understand if the 
military stock behaves in a different way than the overall market trend, and to what extent 
the military stocks under-performs or outperforms the market benchmark. 
We follow a similar methodology as experiment 1. We consider the price change (i.e. the 
gain) of each stock 5 days and 1 day before the event and we compare it with the gain 
after the event using a paired t-test. Using our notation, we check the statistical difference 
between the gain    
  ( ) and    
  ( ) for all the stocks   and event    ; and the same for 
   
  ( ) and    
  ( ). We therefore include all the stocks in the comparison without 
performing different experiments for different stocks. In this way we check if the set of 
military stocks are overall changing their price in reaction to geopolitical events. Table 13 
shows the results of the price comparisons. Table 14 shows the same experiment with the 
S&P 500 prices, to check how the S&P 500 is also reacting to geopolitical events. 
In the last part of the experiment I examine if the price change of the military stocks 
differs significantly from the S&P 500 price change. The comparison is valid since, even 
if all the seven military stocks are part of the S&P 500 index, their total capitalisation is 
about 2% of the index capitalisation, and therefore they are too small to manipulate the 
price. In order to do a meaningful comparison with the S&P 500 index, we compute an 
aggregated index for our seven stocks in the same way the S&P 500 is computed. In fact, 
the S&P 500 is a weighted average of each stock value based on the capitalisation of each 
stock. We followed the same approach. The price changes of each military stock are 
weighted by the capitalisation of the stock relative to the total capitalisation of all the 
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seven stocks. In table 6, the column Capitalisation reports the percentage of each stock 
over the total. For instance, HON represents almost 25% of the total capitalisation of the 
seven military stocks. Finally, Table 15 shows the comparison between the S&P 500 
index and our military stocks index 1 and 5 days after an event.     
    is used to refer to 
the gain of our military stocks index after   days from the event. 
Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  t-value Significance 
          0.25% 0.002158 1.17 = (+ with cl=0.85) 
          1.18% 0.005196 2.27 ++ 
 
Table 13 Comparisons between military stocks price before and after a geopolitical event 
Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  t-value Significance 
   
        
   0.089% 0.003158 0.281 =  
   
        
   0.69% 0.0044 1.53 + 
 
  Table 14 Comparisons between S&P 500 price before and after a geopolitical event 
Indicators Mean Difference 
     
√ 
  t-
value 
Significance 
   
        
   0.042% 
(avg    
  =0.075% avg 
   
  =0.033%) 
0.001609 0.281 =  
   
        
   0.38% 
(avg    
  =2.15%, avg 
   
  =1.77%) 
0.00303 1.254 = (+ with 
cl=0.85) 
 
Table 15 Comparisons between military stock prices v S&P 500 index prices before and 
after a geopolitical event. 
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5.1.9 EXPERIMENT 2: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 13 confirms that, one week after the geopolitical event, the price of military stocks 
is higher than the price before the event (confidence level 0.99). However, this effect is 
much smaller after one day immediately after the event, where the price is still higher but 
a t-value of 1.17 guarantees statistical significance only for a confidence level of 0.85. 
 
The though process then shifted to if this increase is specific to military stocks or it also 
affects the market, represented by the S&P 500 index. Table 14 shows that actually the 
entire market increased after one week from an event, even if with smaller confidence 
level (confidence level=0.9, t-value=1.53), while there is no statistical difference for the 
price after 1 day from the event.  
 
Finally, given that both the market and the military stocks significantly increased their 
value after an event, an examination took place to ascertain if there is a statistical 
difference between the increase of the seven military stocks and the increase of S&P 500. 
Table 15 shows how there is no statistical difference 1 day after the event, while there is a 
low statistical difference in favour of the military stocks one week after the event 
(confidence level = 0.85, t-value=1.25).  
We conclude how both military stocks and the market index significantly increase one 
week after geopolitical events, and there is a low tendency of military stocks to 
outperform the market during that week. 
 
5.1.10 EXPERIMENT 3: PREDICTING STOCK PRICE MOVEMENTS AFTER GEOPOLITICAL 
EVENTS 
In this experiment we investigate if it is possible to predict the price of a military stock 
one week after a geopolitical event based on a set of features including SNA metrics, 
historical prices and S&P 500 index prices. 
The set of features includes the SNA metrics of the before networks at 2, 5 and 20 days, 
plus the SNA metrics of network the day of the event. Regarding historical prices, we 
include the price of 1 week before the event, the price of the day before the event and the 
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closing price of the day of the event. We also include the same historical prices for the 
S&P 500. 
Using a J48 decision tree algorithm, our goal is to predict    , i.e. the future movement of 
the price of a stock after 5 days form the event. We model the prediction problem as a 
binary classification problem, meaning that we aim to predict if the value of      will be 
above or below a certain threshold   . Even if the most obvious choice is     , we 
actually chose the value        , that means that we aim to predict if the price of the 
stock will rise above 1% in the next following days. The reasons why we have set this 
threshold are the following.  
First, there is a reason linked to our dataset. Our dataset covers a period of time from 2011 
to 2014, a period where the US stock market was mainly bullish with a steady positive 
trend. In our dataset 86.4% of cases the stock price increased a week after an event. 
Therefore, by using a threshold of 0 the two classes to be predicted would be too 
unbalanced.  
On the other side, the median value of the weekly stock price change in our dataset is 
equal to 1.21%. Therefore, by setting a threshold at 1%, (quite close to the median value), 
our dataset includes about 62% of positive case and 38% of negative ones.  
Moreover, there is a technical trading consideration. Predicting if the price will rise or 
decrease is not enough for sustaining a profitable trading strategy after commission costs 
are considered. A gain of 1% is regarded as a solid psychological threshold for a 
successful weekly trading strategy. 
The following table describes the list of features used in our classifier. Note how features 
are divided into market-based (mainly historical prices of stocks and S&P 500 index) and 
SNA-based features. 
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Feature Description 
In all the features, the apex   represent the time interval and it takes the values -10, -5, 
-1 and 1. 
  
 ( ) Number of nodes in the networks, equal to the number of 
users active on the network 
  ( ) Number of edges of the networks, equal to the number of 
users cited 
  ( ) Density of the network   
  ( ) Freeman’s centralisation of the network   
    ( ) Average in-betweeness centrality of the network   
    ( ) Newmann’s modularity of the network   
     ( ) The Gini index of the distribution of the number of 
messages posted on the network. Note how this indicator 
is not strictly speaking an SNA indicator 
    ( ) Diameter of the network   
  Stock considered, belonging to the set {UTX, HON, NOC, 
ATK, LLL, LMT, RNT} 
   
       
      
      
  Return of the S&P 500 index 10, 5 and 1 days before the 
event and the day of the event 
  
      
     
     
  Return of the stock   10, 5 and 1 days before the event 
and the day of the event 
  
           Binary class to be predicted 
 
Table 16 List of Features used 
Considering that each feature is considered with a time interval of 10, 5, and 1 day before 
the event and 1 day after, there are 41 features and 1 predictive class to be considered. All 
of them are numeric, except the feature stick that is nominal. 
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The database contains 462 elements, and it has been divided into training and a testing set 
with a 70/30 split. Using the open source software Weka, we trained three different J48 
decision tree model with a pruning factor of 0.02 (results are not changing significantly for 
other choices of the factor). The first model (called      has been trained using all the 
features, the second model, called      , has been trained using market-related features 
(stock and index historical prices) and the third model (    ) has been trained using 
SNA-related features. 
The following figures describe the results for the three classifiers. The key metrics used to 
compare the models are based on the analysis of the confusion matrix, such as precision, 
recall, F-measure. Although trials were performed for each model, the performance of the 
models did not show high variance and therefore the data presented are good 
representative of a typical performance for each model. 
=== Summary === 
Number of Leaves  :  13 
Size of the tree :  20 
 
Correctly Classified Instances          120               83.5052 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances        24                16.4948 % 
Kappa statistic                          0.6468 
Mean absolute error                      0.1755 
Root mean squared error                  0.3797 
Relative absolute error                 37.1309 % 
Root relative squared error             78.1412 % 
Total Number of Instances               144      
 
=== Detailed Accuracy By Class === 
 
               TP Rate   FP Rate   Precision   Recall  F-Measure   ROC Area  
Class 
               0.757     0.117      0.8       0.757     0.778      0.861    0 
               0.883     0.243      0.855     0.883     0.869      0.861    1 
Weighted Avg.  0.835     0.195      0.834     0.835     0.834      0.861 
 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
  a   b   <-- classified as 
 42   12  |  a = 0 
 11   78  |  b = 1 
 
Figure 10 Typical performance of the     model. 
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=== Summary === 
Number of Leaves  :  8 
Size of the tree :  15 
 
Correctly Classified Instances          119               82.4742 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances        25                17.5258 % 
Kappa statistic                          0.6267 
Mean absolute error                      0.1954 
Root mean squared error                  0.4008 
Relative absolute error                 41.3502 % 
Root relative squared error             82.4754 % 
Total Number of Instances               144      
 
=== Detailed Accuracy By Class === 
 
               TP Rate   FP Rate   Precision   Recall  F-Measure   ROC Area  
Class 
                 0.757     0.133      0.778     0.757     0.767      0.827    0 
                 0.867     0.243      0.852     0.867     0.86       0.827    1 
Weighted Avg.    0.825     0.201      0.824     0.825     0.824      0.827 
 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
  a    b   <-- classified as 
 41    13 |  a = 0 
 11    78 |  b = 1 
 
Figure 11 Typical performance of the       price model. 
=== Summary === 
Number of Leaves  :  19 
Size of the tree :  32 
 
Correctly Classified Instances          93               64.5833 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances        51               35.4166 % 
Kappa statistic                          0.2415 
Mean absolute error                      0.3531 
Root mean squared error                  0.5444 
Relative absolute error                 74.7013 % 
Root relative squared error            112.0202 % 
Total Number of Instances               144      
 
=== Detailed Accuracy By Class === 
 
               TP Rate   FP Rate   Precision   Recall  F-Measure   ROC Area  
Class 
                 0.486     0.25       0.545     0.486     0.514      0.68     0 
                 0.75      0.514      0.703     0.75      0.726      0.68     1 
Weighted Avg.    0.649     0.413      0.643     0.649     0.645      0.68  
 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
  a     b    <-- classified as 
 28    26 |  a = 0 
 21    68 |  b = 1 
 
Figure 12 Typical performance of the     model. 
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Model Correct 
predictions 
Precision Recall F-Measure 
     120/144 0.834 0.835 0.834 
       119/144 0.824 0.825 0.827 
     93/144 0.643 0.649 0.645 
 
Table 17 Summary of Precision, Recall and F measure results 
 
5.1.11 EXPERIMENT 3: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
There is a clear distinction among the two models that includes market-related features  
     and         and the      model. The      and the        model has high and 
very similar performance, with an accuracy of about 82%-83%. In general, this represents 
an extremely high value considering the fact that stock market prices forecast is a hard 
task and there is a strong consensus in literature that stock market prices behave like 
random walks and therefore cannot be predicted. However, in period of sustained market 
trend (such as 2011-2014), similar numbers have been reported in literature. For instance, 
Bollen (2010) studied the predictive capability of Twitter discussions and he reported an 
accuracy of 83.3% in predicting the closing price of the S&P 500 index in October 2010. 
However, the main result of our analysis is not the absolute level of accuracy of the 
predictors, but the fact that the addition of SNA metrics to the feature set did not add any 
value.     and the       have comparable performance, meaning that a classifier based 
on historical prices only has the same predictive capabilities of a classifier based on 
historical prices and SNA metrics. Moreover, the      model, only based on SNA 
metrics, has an accuracy of around 65%, underperforming the other two classifiers by 
about 18%. Moreover, an accuracy of 65% is still significantly higher than a naïve zero-
rule classifier (62% positive case, 38% negative case). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that online communities’ metrics has little or no predictive 
value in helping predicting the future price of stocks. 
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5.1.12 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have presented a set of experiments to analyse how online financial 
communities and the market react to geopolitical events related to conflicts, war and 
political instability. 
Our experiment on online communities of investors showed how the dynamics of such 
communities do change in the 2 days immediately after a geopolitical crisis. The 
discussions are bigger, more intense, centralised and they gravitate around a few group of 
individuals that appear to be authoritative users leading the discussion and connecting the 
remaining actors in the networks. This effect fades rapidly one week from the event and it 
disappears after 1 month. 
Our price analysis revealed how military stocks significantly increase their price one week 
after a geo-political event. However, the market itself, represented by the S&P 500 index, 
also increased its price significantly. Both of the effects are present 1 week after the event, 
while they are present with a smaller effect 1 day after. The comparison between the S&P 
500 and seven military stocks considered shows how military stocks outperformed the 
market, but the gap is significant only with a confidence level of 0.85%. 
Finally, experiment 3 showed how SNA metrics before and during a geo-political event do 
not add predictive value to the task of predicting future price movements 1 week after an 
event. A classifier based only on historical prices outperformed a classifier based on SNA 
metrics by 18%, while a classifier obtained by merging historical prices and SNA metrics 
exhibited similar performance to the price-based classifier. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter will look to summarise the findings of the experiments in an attempt to 
answer the research questions. 
6.1 RESEARCH DEFINITION AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
As described in the outset of this thesis the research question is concerned with the 
following questions and is broken down into the following subsections. 
6.1.1 HOW DO ONLINE FINANCIAL COMMUNITIES REACT TO MILITARY AND TERRORIST 
GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS 
The frequency range examined was a period of 2, 5 and 20 days.  The SNA metrics taken 
into consideration were nodes, edges, density, centrality, betweenness, modularity, Gini 
index and diameter. The results established that after a period of two days the SNA 
metrics are considerably higher. In most cases geopolitical events generate an intensified 
communication, with an increase number of actors within the online community and a 
more centralised network. 
6.1.2 HOW DOES THE STOCK MARKET REACT TO MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICAL 
EVENTS  
The aim of the test was to establish if the stock price of the seven US military stocks after 
geopolitical events differs significantly from the price before the events. The results 
established that after one week of geopolitical events, the price of military stocks is higher 
than the price before the event using a confidence level of 0.99%. 
6.1.3 CAN MILITARY STOCK PRICES BE PREDICTED AFTER A MILITARY OR TERRORIST 
GEOPOLITICAL EVENT  
The objective was to establish if it was possible to predict the price of military stocks one 
week after a geopolitical event based on a set of features including SNA metrics, historical 
prices and S&P 500 index prices. The evidence concluded that online community’s 
metrics has little or no predictive value in helping predicting the future price of stocks. 
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6.2 LIMITATIONS  
There was a huge data set collected for this thesis. This included the Somali Pirate crises, 
French intervention in Mali, the Iraq 2003 war, the Iran nuclear crisis and North Korean 
nuclear crises. The collected data also included the news for each day per stock in 
conjunction with a news sentiment rating. Further work identified where various military 
stocks were linked to associated military stocks on the same Bloomberg stock news page. 
It was deducted that recent military operations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe 
would serve as a foundation for these experiments as these geopolitical events are quite 
recent and familiar to the general population.  
6.3 FUTURE WORK AND RESEARCH 
There are many research question open for future work such as from a real-time 
perspective can an investment bank influence a single actor or a cluster of actors on the 
network in terms of spreading good sentiment to boost single military stock activity, or in 
the opposite case decrease military stock activity?  Is it possible to identify an actor or 
influencer on the network that is profitable to the Investment Bank? Is it possible to 
uncover hidden networks that have hidden agenda’s to influence stock market prices? 
What influence the collected sentiment has on the stock prices, geopolitical events and the 
S&P 500.  Future research could also use text mining with predictive mining for 
geopolitical events. 
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